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Preface 
This paper reports work which is part of the EU-India Network on Trade and Development. The 
project is run by the Consumer Unity & Trust Society (CUTS), Jaipur (India), and the University of 
Sussex. We would like to thank the participants of the Midterm Review Meeting in Jaipur on 
December 20–21, 2002 for constructive criticism. We are particularly indebted to our discussant T.N. 
Srinivasan and to Alan Winters for many helpful suggestions. Thanks are also due to Rolf J. 
Langhammer and several anonymous referees for comments on the second draft of this paper. 
Manoranjan Pattanayak provided research assistance. 
According to the terms of reference for the Investment Group of the above mentioned project, we 
focus on the pros and cons of a multilateral framework for cross-border investment activity. The rise 
of bilateral investment treaties as well as previous attempts to reach international agreements on 
investment issues provide the starting points of this discussion. The major aim is to assess what a 
multilateral framework may offer in addition to bilateral and plurilateral rules. More specifically, the 
terms of reference consider the following issues to be of major relevance: 
•  the extent to which a multilateral framework would increase transparency and reduce transaction 
costs; 
•  the opportunity costs and trade-offs to which a multilateral framework may give rise; 
•  the possible effects on the quantity of FDI flows to participating countries; 
•  the request of developing countries for a balanced agreement, including corporate obligations and 
allowing for flexibility and privileged status of developing host countries, in order to improve the 
“quality” of FDI; 
•  the economic justification of performance requirements which may turn out to be a particularly 
contentious issue in negotiations on a framework for investment; 
•  and the prospects for a multilateral framework to prevent the widely feared “race to the top” with 
regard to FDI incentives. 
 
Even though this list covers a fairly broad spectrum of questions, two major limitations of our 
analysis should be mentioned at the outset. First, we discuss the pros and cons of a multilateral 
investment agreement, rather than the effects of capital flows in recipient countries. In particular, it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to carefully assess the benefits developing countries may derive from 
inflows of FDI. We do note, however, that the relevant literature suggests that favorable growth effects 
of FDI in developing countries cannot be taken for granted (which is in some contrast to the currently 
prevailing euphoria about FDI among policymakers). 
Second, the main body of the paper is confined to negotiation issues that are strictly related to cross-
border investment, notably FDI. This discussion leads us to conclude that the economic case for a 
multilateral agreement is weaker than its proponents suggest. We are well aware that the political case 
for such an agreement may be stronger once linkages between narrowly defined investment issues and 
various trade and labor issues are taken into account. As a matter of fact, in the concluding section, we 
suggest that developing countries should consider cross-issue linkages in WTO negotiations and the 
option to enter into a “grand bargain”. The position we take has been criticized from opposite angles 
by several referees: 
•  On the one hand, the suggestion for a grand bargain is dismissed as irrelevant, not worth 
considering, or inconsistent with the economic arguments against a multilateral investment 
agreement. 
•  On the other hand, a broader discussion of the merits of cross-issue linkages is called for as the 
fragmentation of production makes trade and investment closely intertwined. 
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We principally accept the second critique, which logically implies that the first critique is 
misplaced. Nevertheless, we decided not to enter more deeply into the merits and possible drawbacks 
of cross-issue linkages. As economists not being involved in WTO negotiations, we lack comparative 
advantage to analyze which specific effects investment-related concessions by developing countries 
may have on the negotiation stance of industrialized countries in various areas of immediate interest to 
developing countries, including agriculture, barriers against imports from poor countries and anti-
dumping rules. If at all, the reaction patterns may be identified in the process of WTO negotiations. 
We would like to maintain, however, that our economic analysis suggests that developing countries 
could make investment-related concessions from which they have little to lose, while industrialized 
countries seem to care for them and may, thus, be more inclined to offer quid pro quo-concessions. 
 
1  Why Foreign Direct Investment Is on the Agenda of Policymakers 
Especially since recent financial crises in Asia and Latin America, developing and newly 
industrializing countries have been strongly advised to rely primarily on foreign direct investment 
(FDI), in order to supplement national savings by capital inflows and promote economic development. 
Even harsh critics of rash and comprehensive capital account liberalization argue in favor of opening 
up towards FDI (e.g., Stiglitz 2000). It is for several reasons that developing countries may benefit 
from FDI inflows: 
•  Foreign direct investors typically have a longer-term perspective when engaging in a host country. 
As a consequence, FDI is less volatile and less prone to crisis than other private capital flows 
(Nunnenkamp 2001a: Figure 9). 
•  In contrast to debt inflows constituting contractually fixed debt-service obligations, FDI 
constitutes a residual claim on the host country's resources. In other words, FDI has risk-sharing 
properties. 
•  While debt-related capital inflows may be used for consumption, FDI is more likely to add to 
domestic investment. Yet, overall investment may remain unaffected by FDI inflows, especially if 
they come in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). 
•  FDI is more than just capital; it also offers access to internationally available technologies and 
management know-how. Firms and workers in the host country may benefit from economic 
spillovers so that productivity increases are not restricted to foreign-dominated operations. 
 
For all these reasons, it is widely expected that FDI provides a stronger stimulus to economic 
growth in the host countries than other types of capital inflows. Recent empirical studies on the FDI-
growth link do provide some support to this proposition (e.g., Soto 2000). However, the available 
evidence also suggests a major qualification when it comes to the productivity-increasing effects of 
FDI in developing countries.0F1 In one way or another, recent studies echo an earlier finding of 
Blomström et al. (1994), namely that the positive impact of FDI on economic growth is confined to 
higher-income developing countries. As it seems, developing countries must have reached a minimum 
level of economic and institutional development before they can capture the growth-enhancing effects 
of FDI. 
Nevertheless, more and more developing countries have entered the worldwide competition for 
FDI. This trend is clearly reflected in an almost universal move to liberalize national FDI regulations 
(Figure 1). In 1991–2001, about 95 percent of all changes in national FDI regimes, reported by 
UNCTAD (2002: 7), were meant to treat FDI more favorably. Liberalization measures or measures 
aimed at strengthening the functioning of markets as well as increased FDI incentives are included in 
this category.1F2 By contrast, just 78 out of almost 1400 measures taken in 1991–2001 intensified 
control over FDI or reduced FDI incentives. 5 
   
The World Bank (2003: 118) reckons: “As with trade reforms, unilateral reforms to liberalize 
foreign direct investment (FDI) are likely to have the greatest and most direct benefit for the reforming 
country.” Apart from unilateral liberalization measures, various countries have concluded bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) for the protection and promotion of FDI. The number of BITs increased 
significantly to 2099 at the end of 2001. As it seems, both the liberalization of FDI regulations and the 
protection of foreign investors against political risk is fairly advanced. Hence, the obvious question 
arises why a multilateral agreement on investment may be needed. 







































aShaded area: changes considered more favorable to FDI; figures in brackets below years refer to the number of countries that 
introduced changes in their FDI regime. 
Source: UNCTAD (2002: 7). 
According to the Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration, the purpose of a new multilateral framework 
on investment is “to secure transparent, stable, and predictable conditions for long-term cross-border 
investment” (WTO 2001: Paragraph 20). From this statement, one may conclude that the basic WTO 
rationale of the benefits of rule-making in international economic relations does not only apply to 
trade but also to cross-border investment. However, trade and capital flows differ in several respects. 
Stanley Fischer, even though a prominent supporter of free international capital flows, acknowledges 
that “the difference between the analytical understanding of capital versus current-account restrictions 
is striking. The economics profession knows a great deal about current-account liberalization, its 
desirability, and effective ways of liberalizing. It knows far less about capital-account liberalization” 
(Fischer 1998: 8). Empirical research, too, suggests that the case for multilateral rule-making is 
stronger for trade than for investment. While “openness to trade has unambiguously helped the 
representative Third World economy” (Lindert and Williamson as quoted in World Bank 2002: 5), 
empirical studies reveal ambiguous effects of capital inflows in developing countries, even in the case 
of FDI. Furthermore, an investment agreement is inherently different from a trade agreement in that 
developing countries are, almost invariably, net receivers of FDI, whereas industrialized countries are 
both important receivers and senders of FDI.2F3 Consequently, conflicts of interest and bargaining 
asymmetries tend to be more pronounced when it comes to an investment agreement. 
In the remainder of this introductory section, we present the major arguments of the proponents and 
opponents of a multilateral agreement on investment. These arguments will be taken up and analyzed 
in more detail in the subsequent sections. In doing so, we will not apply a strict definition of 6 
   
“investment”. The existing regulatory environment, including BITs and investment-related agreements 
on a plurilateral level, covers different types of foreign investment, with some agreements extending 
far beyond FDI. However, our discussion will focus on FDI, since it is mainly the rise of FDI that is 
widely expected to help developing countries foster their economic development. 
Contentious issues related to a multilateral agreement on investment center around four questions: 
Is there any need for such an agreement? What should it contain? Should binding rules, or rather 
flexible guidelines be aimed at? What would be the likely effects on the quantity and quality of FDI? 
Many developing countries are opposed to a multilateral agreement on investment, while its 
proponents are mainly to be found in industrialized countries. Likewise, disagreement is mainly 
between developing and industrialized countries when it comes to the contents and character of a 
multilateral framework. However, interests differ also within these groups, and independent experts 
provide different answers to these questions. 
As concerns the need for a multilateral agreement, opponents point out that the liberalization of FDI 
regulations has progressed rapidly through unilateral, bilateral and plurilateral initiatives. The 
accompanying boom of FDI is said to reveal the irrelevance of a multilateral framework. By contrast, 
proponents conjecture multilateral negotiations on investment to be instrumental to greater openness 
of investment regimes than can be achieved unilaterally. They also argue that it is precisely because of 
the proliferation of BITs and plurilateral rules that a multilateral agreement is required. This 
proliferation is deemed unwarranted, since the complexity and intransparency of FDI regulations is 
increased, rather than reduced in this way. If a multilateral agreement were to become “a 'one-stop' 
substitute for the complex and legally divergent web of existing BITs” (World Bank 2003: 127), this 
would not only improve transparency. According to the proponents of a multilateral agreement, this 
could also help counterbalance the bargaining asymmetries built into BITs and regional agreements. 
For example, it might become easier for developing countries to prevent non-investment matters such 
as labor and environmental standards from being included in agreements on investment. However, 
many developing countries appear to be reluctant to buy the argument that their bargaining power 
would be stronger in a multilateral context than in their bilateral dealings with major industrialized 
countries. 
The proponents in industrialized countries suggest that the contents of a multilateral agreement 
should be similar to what was discussed during the failed attempt at the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) among OECD countries in the 1990s (for details, see Section 4 below). This implies 
that the focus would be on guarantees for foreign investors related to entry and post-entry conditions. 
Developing countries are opposed to this approach which they regard as biased towards the interests of 
foreign investors. If a multilateral agreement is not plainly rejected, developing countries ask for a 
balanced agreement which, according to their view, should include obligations of foreign investors.  
Whether rules should be binding or flexible is debated on different levels. Most fundamentally, 
skeptics doubt whether it is, theoretically and empirically, feasible to apply to investment the principle 
of free movement as applied to goods and services. Unlike goods and services, investment is 
considered an ill defined entity and a reflection of imperfect international markets for technology. It is 
pointed out that the activities of foreign investors are highly diverse, involving operation, 
maintenance, use, sale or liquidation of an investment. More practically, it is disputed what exactly 
should be binding. Developing countries are pressing for binding rules on corporate behavior, but are 
reluctant to tie their own hands. Not surprisingly, the business community in industrialized countries 
favors exactly the opposite: Binding commitments by host countries are considered necessary in order 
to lock in unilateral reforms and provide additional protection of investors' rights. 
As concerns possible effects of a multilateral agreement, developing countries are mainly concerned 
about the quality of FDI. In other words, they want to ensure, e.g. through corporate obligations, that 
FDI fosters economic development in the host country. On the other hand, the business sector in 
industrialized countries is striving for an agreement which would expand investment opportunities in 
potential host countries. As will be argued below, the effects of a multilateral agreement on both, the 
quality and quantity of FDI may easily be exaggerated. 
Against this backdrop, we proceed by presenting the basic characteristics of BITs and discussing 
possible shortcomings in Section 2. Subsequently, we review plurilateral arrangements related to the 7 
   
treatment of FDI in regional trade agreements (RTAs) (Section 3). This leads to the question of what a 
multilateral agreement on investment may offer in addition to existing agreements. The failure in the 
late 1990s to conclude the MAI among OECD countries provides the starting point for addressing this 
question (Section 4). Next, we discuss whether and why another attempt to agree on a multilateral 
framework should be undertaken (Section 5). Major issues related to such an agreement such as 
performance requirements (Section 6) and incentives competition (Section 7) are analyzed in more 
detail. Section 8 summarizes and discusses strategic options of developing countries of how to proceed 
in investment-related multilateral negotiations.  
2  Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Apart from unilateral regulatory changes, the desire of governments to facilitate FDI flows is also 
reflected in a dramatic increase in the number of BITs for the protection and promotion of FDI during 
the 1990s (UNCTAD 1997: 19). Less than 400 BITs were reported at the beginning of the 1990s, 
more than 80 percent of which involved at least one developed country as a partner. The number of 
BITs soared to 2099 at the end of 2001. 
The proliferation of BITs can at least partly be attributed to the absence of a multilateral framework 
on investment. Yet, it is open to question whether this trend can be reversed by including investment 
in the Doha agenda (see also Section 5 below). Many developing countries are opposed to binding 
multilateral investment rules, despite the argument that their bargaining position would become 
stronger in a multilateral context. As a matter of fact, the proliferation of BITs is largely because 
developing countries were eager to conclude BITs, either with developed countries or among 
themselves. In 2001, 86 percent of the 158 BITs concluded involved at least one developing partner 
country (Figure 2). Moreover, the largest share of BITs concluded in 2001 were an intra-developing 
country affair. It should also be noted that BIT activity was not restricted to relatively advanced 
developing countries, but involved various least developed countries as well. In 2001, a number of 23 
least developed countries concluded 51 BITs, 13 of which least developed countries signed among 
themselves. 













aDC= developing countries; IC = developed countries; CEE = Central and Eastern European countries. 
Source: UNCTAD (2002: 8). 8 
   
 
As mentioned before, BITs are considered a means to facilitate FDI flows and to provide foreign 
investors with a clear legal framework, in order to reduce uncertainty related to the treatment of FDI in 
potential host countries before and after entry. However, reducing legal uncertainty by concluding a 
large number of BITs may come at a cost for foreign investors. An ever increasing number of BITs 
tends to reduce transparency and may render it difficult for foreign investors, notably relatively small 
enterprises engaging in FDI, to collect and evaluate the relevant information. Transaction costs related 
to FDI can, thus, be expected to rise with the number of BITs. 
Consider the case of a German investor who wants to outsource relatively labor-intensive parts of 
his production to a developing country. Apart from evaluating economic fundamentals in potential 
developing host countries, the investor will have to study various BITs and compare the legal 
framework laid out there. As of January 2000, Germany had signed 124 BITs, more than any other 
country at that time (UNCTAD 2000b: 9); 102 BITs had been concluded with developing countries. 
Even if the investor had shortlisted some developing countries on the basis of economic fundamentals, 
information costs might still be substantial when it comes to evaluating the relevant BITs. 
Information costs and transparency do not only depend on the number of BITs. Actually, lack of 
transparency would be a minor problem, if legal and administrative procedures and regulations were 
the same in all BITs signed by one particular country. This is not the case, however, even though most 
BITs do have common features (see Box 1). There is considerable uniformity in various principles, but 
specific formulations vary. Furthermore, some BITs go beyond the principles noted in Box 1. This is 
particularly in two respects. First, most BITs do not grant the right of establishment to foreign 
investors, whereas some BITs provide a guarantee of national and MFN treatment on entry and 
establishment. Second, some BITs prohibit performance requirements with regard to local content, 
exports and employment, as conditions for the entry or operation of foreign investors. 
Box 1 
Important Similarities between BITsa 
 
•  Broad and open-ended definition of foreign investment. 
•  Entry and establishment subject to national laws and regulations. 
•  Fair and equitable treatment of foreign investors. 
•  Principle of national treatment of foreign investors, but often subject to qualifications and 
exceptions. 
•  MFN treatment, subject to some standardized exceptions. 
•  Right of the host country to expropriate foreign investors, subject to the condition that 
expropriation is non-discriminatory and accompanied by compensation. 
•  Guarantee of free transfer of payments related to a foreign investment, often qualified by 
exceptions in case of balance-of-payments problems. 
•  State-to-state dispute-settlement provisions; investor-to-state dispute settlement becoming 
standard practice. 
 
aFor a more detailed presentation, see UNCTAD (1998a: 100) and CUTS (2001: 8 f.). 
 
From the perspective of foreign investors, the limitations of BITs are primarily related to transaction 
costs. In addition to the sheer number of BITs with different regulations and procedures, the reduction 
in non-economic risk through BITs is sometimes considered insufficient. Major shortcomings of most 
BITs are seen in lacking protection against violations of intellectual property rights, and in 
discretionary interventions by sub-national authorities of host countries that are not prevented by BITs. 
Developing host countries, too, are concerned about shortcomings of BITs. This may be surprising 
since, as mentioned before, developing countries were signatories of most of the recently concluded 
BITs. As it seems, developing countries faced a dilemma: They entered into BITs in order to improve 
their chances to attract FDI, even though the bargaining position of an individual host country, 9 
   
especially if it was small, vis-à-vis foreign investors and their home countries was too weak to have a 
say on the exact terms of BITs.3F4 Hence, developing countries frequently complain that BITs are biased 
in that host countries (have to) agree to binding obligations in various respects, whereas foreign 
investors benefit from rights without assuming any duties. For example, BITs typically do not include 
provisions against restrictive business practices; they do not define basic labor standards to which 
foreign investors shall adhere; and they do not address the issue of binding obligations of foreign 
investors with regard to social responsibilities and transfers of technology. 
Coordination among developing countries may offer a way to strengthen their bargaining position in 
dealing with foreign investors and their governments. However, as shown below, the widely perceived 
bias of rights and duties in favor of foreign investors is also underlying the reservation of many 
developing countries to enter into negotiations on a multilateral framework on cross-border investment 
issues (Kumar 2001; Singh 2001). Moreover, it is open to question whether FDI would offer more 
benefits to developing host countries, if investment agreements were to include binding commitments 
of foreign investors. On the one hand, the “quality” of realized FDI projects may improve, if 
agreements ensure that FDI helps achieve development objectives of host countries. On the other 
hand, strict requirements imposed on foreign investors may have as a consequence that the amount of 
FDI flowing to developing countries declines. Foreign investors always have the option not to 
undertake FDI projects under conditions they consider unprofitable. The severity of this trade-off 
depends on whether or not investment agreements can reasonably be expected to induce more FDI. 
The experience with BITs suggests that the amount of FDI flowing to developing countries is 
largely determined by factors other than investment agreements. UNCTAD (1998a: 117) argues that 
“it would be unreasonable to expect that any improvements in the investment climate brought about by 
BITs, which relate only to parts of the FDI policy framework, could exert a significant impact on FDI 
flows.” Several empirical analyses confirm the relative insignificance of BITs in determining FDI: 
•  UNCTAD (1998b) analyzed time-series data on bilateral FDI flows between the signatory 
countries of a BIT. It was shown that the host country’s share in the outward FDI of the home 
country increased only marginally after the signing of a BIT. This suggests that BITs do not cause 
significant diversion of FDI from host countries not being part of the agreement to host countries 
being signatories of BITs. 
•  Hallward and Driemeier, the results of whom are summarized in World Bank (2003: Box 4.4), 
compared FDI flows in the three years after a BIT was signed to those in the three years before. 
No significant increase in FDI was found. 
•  When analyzing FDI determinants across  133 countries, UNCTAD (1998b) found that the 
number of BITs signed by a host country played only a minor role for both, FDI flows and stocks 
in 1995. 
•  The cross-country evaluation of Hallward and Driemeier made use of 20 years of data on bilateral 
FDI flows from OECD countries to 31 developing countries. Controlling for a time trend, there 
was little independent role for BITs in accounting for the increase in FDI. 
Each approach may have its particular data problems and econometric shortcomings. For example, 
the reliability of causal inferences drawn from cross-country studies depends on the quality of 
controlling variables. In a time-series context, foreign investors cannot reasonably be expected to 
invest where economic fundamentals remain weak after the conclusion of BITs. Yet, it is striking that 
all available evidence comes to the same conclusion, namely that policymakers are well advised not to 
put their faith in BITs as a major stimulus to higher FDI inflows. Variables such as market size and 
growth, exchange rates and country risk turned out to be more important than BITs as FDI 
determinants in cross-country studies. Time-series studies could only be dismissed if they were 
dominated by countries lacking locational attractiveness except being signatories of BITs, which is 
unlikely to be the case. 
The proliferation of BITs since the 1990s may have eroded the effectiveness of BITs in attracting 
FDI. The conclusion of BITs is no longer a distinctive factor signalling host countries' readiness to 
offer favorable investment conditions by reducing non-economic risk. Rather, foreign investors tend to 
regard BITs as a standard feature of the institutional structure prevailing worldwide. In other words, 10 
   
the proliferation of BITs may be characterized by diminishing returns. Nevertheless, BITs should still 
turn out to be relevant in empirical analyses, if the few developing countries not taking part were 
considered relatively risky locations by foreign investors for this reason and, therefore, suffered 
negative effects on FDI inflows. However, weak economic fundamentals and markets, rather than the 
absence of BITs, appear to be the major factors working against FDI flows into these countries. BITs 
per se do little more than enabling multinational enterprises to invest in a partner country. It is a 
completely different question whether FDI will actually be undertaken as a result of BITs. This is 
rather unlikely, at least until economic fundamentals are conducive to FDI. 
3  Plurilateral Investment Agreements 
In the previous section, we argued that there has been a tremendous proliferation of BITs 
particularly in the 1990s. We also noted that BITs are not a sufficient condition to induce FDI. In 
essence, the role of the BITs seems to be to ensure some certainty in FDI transactions. From another 
point of view, it allows countries to pre-commit to certain investment rules which can then be 
immunized from local interest group interference (Low and Subramaniam 1995). In this section, we 
will see how the principles underlying bilateral treaties tend to be modified in plurilateral investment 
treaties (PITs). 
Most of the PITs have been of recent origin and immediately preceded or followed the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round Agreement in 1995. The signing of PITs also coincided with the tremendous 
growth in regional trading arrangements (RTAs) (UNCTAD 2001). While not as large in number as 
the BITs, the PITs (like RTAs) have proliferated mainly in the 1990s with most countries being 
member of more than one PIT (e.g., UNCTAD 1999a: Chapter IV). Here we will address major issues 
related to PITs by looking at the treatment of investment in five specific RTAs: the Energy Charter, 
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), MERCOSUR, NAFTA, and ASEAN. While the first 
is largely an area-specific RTA involving developed and developing countries, MERCOSUR and 
ASEAN consist of only developing countries and the remaining two involve both developing and 
developed countries. Even for RTAs such as FTAA that have not yet come into force, the treaties' 
intentions and expected features may offer valuable insights. Moreover, a closer look at RTAs may 
help us understand the factors that led to the failure of the OECD's attempt at an MAI which straddled 
a large number of developed and developing countries. 
There are almost no multilateral agreements which are investment specific. Rather, PITs have 
largely evolved as chapters or clauses in RTAs. Even the Energy Charter focuses on trade, transit 
and efficiency issues apart from investment. The 52 countries (as of Sept. 2002) which are signatories 
are drawn from both developing and developed countries of Europe. A number of African countries as 
well as the United States and Canada have an observer status. In Asia, Japan is a recent signatory. The 
charter came into force in April 1998, four years after the signing in 1994. 
The charter relates only to energy. Being highly focused, the agreement guarantees post-entry non-
discriminatory treatment to member country investments. In addition, it guarantees the better of  MFN 
and national treatment in operation (UNCTAD 1996: 555). As concerns pre-entry establishment, 
however, the charter only allows for a “best endeavour” clause. Furthermore, the charter 
“grandfathers” existing exceptions and restrictions, and it allows for the reservation of privatized 
assets for local firms. Finally, the charter includes a comprehensive dispute settlement procedure for 
both state-state and investor-state disputes. The extremely limited product coverage of the charter has 
probably allowed for countries to come to an agreement rather quickly. Countries may accede to the 
charter over time as and when they are ready, thus providing the flexibility required by countries at 
different stages of development. 
The initiative for the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) envisages a far more 
general RTA.4F5 The negotiations were launched in 1998 and the agreement was scheduled to come into 
force by 2005 (UNCTAD 1998a: 59). In making an inventory of the national rules on investment 11 
   
already prevalent in prospective member countries, it turned out that there was a high degree of 
similarity in respect of national and MFN treatment, equality between foreigners and nationals, 
principles of private property and agreements on dispute settlement. As concerns the last issue, many 
negotiation partners were already members of the World Bank’s International Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID; see 
UNCTAD 1998a: 62–63). The exceptions to MFN were also the same in most of the countries, namely 
economic integration agreements, tax treaties and bilateral concessionary finance schemes. In 
international finance, the countries were committed to mobility of capital subject to a balance of 
payments exception. Finally, there was also convergence in expropriation decrees and compensation 
criteria. The divergence came in the definition and scope of investment, processes of authorization and 
registration of foreign investment, treatment of sub-national authorities and industry exceptions. In 
addition, countries differed on pre-entry and post-entry establishment commitments. 
A somewhat different treatment of investment obtains in the ASEAN agreement. Concluded in 
October 1998, the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area derives its value from the 
perceived need to promote the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA). The agreement includes a waiver of 
the 30 percent national equity requirement under the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme, and it 
extends to all services and modes of supply (UNCTAD 1999a). However, the agreement relies on 
voluntary cooperation with no legal bindings or dispute settlement mechanisms (UNCTAD 1998a). 
There is no provision for investor-state dispute resolution in the Protocol on Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism. Furthermore, the agreement specifies a negative list of industry exceptions and balance of 
payments safeguards in case of external financial difficulties (ASEAN 1998). The national treatment 
(including right to entry) is presently limited only to ASEAN investors with a large number of sectoral 
exceptions to go only by 2010 (UNCTAD 2002). In general, the ASEAN agreement on investment 
reflects the unwillingness of East and South East Asian countries to  being tied down to legal specifics 
in international agreements (Pant  2002). 
The ASEAN RTA has evolved in a series of steps. The 1987 Agreement for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments was followed by the Framework Agreement on Economic Cooperation in 
1992, the setting up of the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) at the fifth ASEAN summit and the 
protocol of 1996 to enhance investor confidence. As a PIT, the ASEAN initiative was much like the 
MERCOSUR agreement (to be discussed below), i.e. largely meant to promote trade among partner 
countries. Thus, national treatment was to be extended to non-ASEAN  investors only by 2020. The 
AIA specifically refers only to FDI, which has traditionally contributed a great deal to exports of 
South East Asian countries in particular. Finally, the agreements do not prevent any of the constituent 
countries from joining other sub-regional initiatives or growth triangles involving adjacent countries.5F6 
By contrast, NAFTA provides for a very comprehensive treatment of investment (NAFTA Treaty 
1994). The free trade area of Canada, Mexico and the United States comes into full operation by 2005, 
ten years after NAFTA was agreed upon.6F7 Chapter 11 of the NAFTA Treaty deals specifically with 
investment. The dominance of the United States in framing the treaty is reflected in the definition of 
investment, which is extremely broad and includes, apart from both direct investment and portfolio 
investment, intellectual property and loans. The scope of the agreement extends MFN and national 
treatment (NT) to both investors and investment. The application of the non-discrimination principles 
is extended by the addition of the clause on “fair and equitable treatment (FET)” to foreign investors. 
The treaty specifically states that no formal and substantive rule can be made which would give 
advantage to local investors. In addition, it is specified that “in like circumstances” there cannot be any 
discrimination with respect to any sphere of operation of  an investment instrument. 
The NAFTA Treaty also contains an elaborate dispute settlement mechanism. A regional Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) allows for international arbitration of disputes. No appeal to the host country 
is available for decisions of the DSB, and the treaty requires that there be some international element 
involved in any investment dispute. In other words, the DSB is only available where the investor 
and/or the investment belong to two different country jurisdictions. Unlike most RTAs, there is 
provision of investor-state dispute settlement (except for pure Canadian companies in Canada) and the 
private party has the right to nominate one of the three members of the DSB (NAFTA Treaty 1994).7F8 12 
   
The treaty applies also to sub-national authorities. In a controversial clause, investors are entitled to 
dispute any governmental action that harms their investment (“regulatory takings”). This has been a 
bone of contention in the widely publicized Ethyl case in Canada (UNCTAD 1998a). 
MERCOSUR is an RTA consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay with Chile and 
Bolivia as associate members since 1996. Created under what is known as the Treaty of Asuncion, 
MERCOSUR was initially to be a common market. Internal struggles and several crises 
notwithstanding, considerable trade liberalization has been achieved since 1991. This is true especially 
for internal tariffs. In addition, the common external tariff applied to 85 percent of all products by June 
1995 (Machado 1995: 19; Schirm 2002: chapter 4). Somewhat like the EU, MERCOSUR also aimed 
at a coordinated policy in regional economic fora. 
Yet, MERCOSUR has little to offer as a PIT. The only instrument is the 1994 Protocol on 
Promotion and Protection of Investments from States not Parties to MERCOSUR. Even this 
instrument only undertakes not to treat foreign investors more favorably than set out in the protocol. 
Furthermore, the parties signatory to the protocol enjoy the discretion to give or not to give MFN and 
national treatment to foreign investments. The protocol does not contain any provisions to bar 
performance requirements or incentives. 
In a recent survey, Gestrain (2002) noted that the extent to which signatories to an RTA attempt to 
establish wide ranging and ambitious rules on foreign investment is largely a function of their previous 
experience with liberal investment regimes. Thus, for example, provisions very similar to those of 
NAFTA can be found in the FTAA agenda.8F9 Similarly, the OECD’s attempt at the MAI (discussed in 
the next section) came after many years of experience with liberal investment regimes in the OECD 
countries. 
Yet, one has to take into account various additional factors to see whether or not RTAs include a 
comprehensive treatment of investment issues. First of all, it is mainly through BITs, rather than RTAs 
that negotiations on investment are pursued (Gestrain 2002). Out of the 172 RTAs (as of 2000), only a 
few deal with investment issues. In contrast to many BITs, investment is narrowly defined as FDI in 
most RTAs, with NAFTA and possibly also FTAA representing major exceptions. A comprehensive 
treatment of investment in RTAs may be difficult to achieve if a large and heterogenous (in terms of 
development criteria like per capita income) set of countries is involved. However, our short account 
of major RTAs also suggests that RTAs among developing countries have a limited coverage of issues 
like dispute settlement and national treatment of foreign investors. Developing countries appear to be 
more oriented towards promoting trade and supporting national companies, rather than foreign 
investment, when it comes to provisions in RTAs. For example, this applies to both MERCOSUR and 
ASEAN. 
The limitations of many RTAs are particularly striking with regard to dispute settlement. The 
importance of a dispute settlement mechanism cannot be doubted given the increase in the number of 
disputes over the last decade. As noted in Gestrain (2002), between 1972 and 1999, 69 disputes were 
registered with ICSID or about two and a half per year. Between January 2000 and February 2002, 29 
disputes were registered, i.e. about 14 per year. Dispute settlement mechanisms are common in BITs, 
but included in just a few comprehensive RTAs like NAFTA.9F10 As we will see in the next section, 
dispute settlement was also among the contentious issues in the OECD’s attempt at the MAI, which 
was the first truly multilateral investment initiative. Some of the points raised here come out in stark 
relief when looking at the factors that led to the failure of the MAI. 13 
   
4  Multilateral Initiatives on Investment 
4.1  The OECD’s MAI 
It has been argued that the objective to launch talks on the MAI in the OECD reflected the logical 
culmination of the process of liberalization in the constituent countries as far back as 1961 (Henderson 
1999). The aim was to broaden the liberalization process via an investment specific instrument. To put 
it another way, it was deemed necessary to extend to investment the same liberal treatment that 
already existed for commodity trade. The MAI essentially attempted to implement the report to the 
OECD submitted by the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CMIE) 
and the Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT) in 1995 (OECD 1995). 
Restrictions on outflows of capital had been almost completely eliminated by 1995. Hence, it seemed 
logical to extend the liberalization to inflows of capital and to codify these rules in the context of both 
international movements of investment and services (Henderson 1999). The MAI was supposed to 
reduce transaction costs, to which the plethora of BITs tended to add. As noted in Section 2, most 
countries have signed a large number of bilateral treaties, resulting in increasing costs of 
understanding the regulations governing FDI in any country. Transaction costs can be entry barriers 
especially for small foreign investors (Gara 2002). 
The starting conditions appeared to be favorable at the beginning of MAI negotiations. Exchange 
controls had gone in all OECD countries along with restrictions on the outward movement of capital. 
Even though restrictions on inflows of capital remained, inflows of FDI had been deregulated in the 
context of major liberalizations of domestic financial markets in the 1990s and RTAs like NAFTA, 
EU and MERCOSUR. A similar liberalization took place in other countries like Australia and New 
Zealand (Caves and Krause 1984; OECD 1996). The 1980s had witnessed extensive liberalization of 
inflows of capital in Latin American countries like Brazil and Chile. In the same vein, Asian countries 
like China, India and those of the ASEAN as well as countries of Eastern Europe had opened up to 
inflows particularly of FDI (UNCTAD 2000a). 
In general, it could be argued that, both for suppliers and demanders of capital, the mood was 
extremely optimistic in the mid-1990s (Pant 1995). According to Henderson (1999), conditions for an 
MAI could not have been better than in 1995, in terms of the enabling environment and technical 
preparedness. Consequently, the MAI represented the most ambitious initiative so far, involving the 29 
countries of the OECD and eight developing countries including China, Brazil and Argentina. 
However, the developing countries had only an observer status and, thus, had little influence on the 
agenda. In addition, the WTO, World Bank and IMF were represented in MAI negotiations. 
As argued in Witherell (1995), the MAI had to be fairly comprehensive to be an improvement over 
other multilateral instruments and the two existing codes of the OECD which related to the 
liberalization of capital movements and the liberalization of invisible transactions. Box 2 summarizes 
the main features of the planned MAI (for details, see Ley  1997; Witherell  1995; UNCTAD 2001). 
Despite the favorable environment, however, the MAI discussions broke down in 1998. There were 
several issues on which substantial disagreement remained. For one, on the ’scope’ of the agreement, 
the United States supported extra territorial application of national laws which was opposed by EU 
countries (UNCTAD 1999b: 20; Henderson 1999). Second, exceptions for regional integration 
organizations (the REIO clause that is common in other agreements) were opposed by the United 
States, in particular on the grounds that such an exception was contrary to the basic objective of 
market access (UNCTAD 1999b). Third, in the context of ’cultural exceptions’, barring the United 
States, Japan and New Zealand none of the other countries was willing to accept the ’standstill’ clause 
in the audio-visual industry. Fourth, there was considerable disagreement on the introduction of the 
clause on labor and environmental standards. The MAI was abandoned by the time any agreement on 
the issue of standards was reached (Henderson 1999). Fifth, the ’pre-entry establishment’ clause was 
supported by the United States, whereas it was opposed by EU countries like France. Finally, there 14 
   
was disagreement on including the ’investor to state’ clause in dispute settlement particularly in the 
context of ’regulatory takings’ (Graham 1998). All this resulted in a plethora of reservations which 
went into a large number of  chapters which are still not available as public documents. Coupled with 
the exclusion of taxation from the ambit of the MAI, the treaty would at best have been a political 




Principal Features of the Planned MAI 
•  Unlike the previous OECD codes, the MAI was to be a full fledged treaty ratified by legislatures. 
•  A formal dispute settlement mechanism was planned, including provisions for investor-state and 
state-state disputes. 
•  Investment was broadly defined as in the NAFTA agreement. 
•  All phases of investment, including pre-entry establishment, were to be covered by the principles 
of non-discrimination (MFN and national treatment). 
•  Reservations (country-specific exceptions) were subject to ’standstill’, ’rollback’ and ’ratchet’ 
clauses. In other words, there could be no new reservations and existing ones were time bound. 
•  The negative list approach was used with regard to general and specific exceptions. 
•  Performance requirements were to be prohibited or limited, while incentives were to be 
subjected to well defined rules. 
•  Right of access to key foreign personnel was to be guaranteed. 
•  As in GATT, the disciplines of the treaty were to apply to sub-national authorities. 
 
With hindsight, the MAI failed because of a multiplicity of factors (see also Dymond 1999). Some 
of these were treaty specific. On clauses like cultural exceptions, extra territorial application and 
dispute settlement there seemed to be no meeting ground even within the set of OECD countries. In 
addition, many countries were unwilling to commit to the broad definition of investment. It may thus 
be argued that the initial agenda was over ambitious. Subsequently, a treaty was rendered rather 
meaningless by the special interests of many countries as well as the number of reservations and 
exemptions sought (UNCTAD 1999b). 
More generally, the political economy of multilateral negotiations changed substantially in the 
1990s (Pant 2002; UNCTAD 1999a). The business groups, for example, had considerable interest in 
the MAI when negotiations started (ICC 1996). Yet, they lost interest with taxation off the agenda, the 
possibility of minimum labor and environmental standards coming on the agenda, and the dispute 
settlement mechanism being watered down. At the same time, NGOs emerged as an important force 
opposing the MAI agenda. The impact of the NGOs (from both developed and developing countries) 
was aided substantially by the developments in instant electronic communication via the internet 
(Rothkopf 1998; Mathews 1997). The NGOs projected some aspects of the MAI as impinging on the 
sovereignty of consumers and individual countries by giving foreign investors rights without 
obligations. In their view, this was particularly true of investor-state dispute settlement with third party 
intermediation, regulatory takings, and labor and environmental issues (UNCTAD 1999b).  
The broad sweep of the MAI also alienated many countries which saw the prospective treaty as 
placing private interests above state interests (Henderson 1999; France, le Premier Ministre 1998). It 
must be remembered that, in the 1990s, the electorate in many countries had returned Left/Centre 
governments which were more responsive to the concerns of NGOs. In addition, the developing 
countries were effectively excluded from the negotiations and were offered only the choice to take it 
or leave it. With developing countries being increasingly opposed to the process, the MAI came to 
symbolize all that was perceived to be  wrong with globalization (Sauve 1998). In the light of all these 
developments, it would have been political suicide to persist with the MAI. 15 
   
What are the lessons to be learnt? First of all, the existence of a large number of BITs does not 
indicate that countries are ready for a comprehensive multilateral treaty on investment. The specific 
trade-offs that can be negotiated in BITs are not easy to pursue in a multilateral context. Furthermore, 
an ambitious multilateral negotiation agenda is unlikely to succeed unless it offers scope for quid pro 
quo-deals between participating countries pursuing different objectives. The potential for such deals 
was fairly limited in the case of the MAI, as negotiations in the OECD were restricted to investment-
related issues. Under such conditions, it might have been more promising if a modest and incremental 
approach had been taken in MAI negotiations. Considering that even the relatively small and 
homogeneous group of OECD countries could not agree on the ambitious agenda, it was all the more 
unlikely that a larger number of heterogeneous countries, including developing countries, were 
prepared to join. 
The situation is different if investment issues are negotiated under the roof of the WTO, where 
considerable scope exists for quid pro quo-concessions in different areas of negotiations. The Uruguay 
Round is a reminder to this effect. Therefore, we consider different strategic options open to 
developing countries in Section 8 below. Yet, the MAI experience suggests an important caveat: If 
multilateral treaties go beyond trade promotion (the basic objective of GATT) to attempting to 
homogenize the pace of liberalization in contracting parties, the process of negotiation and the final 
settlements may be difficult to sell politically. After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, 
policymakers in OECD countries pushed ahead with liberalization in areas such as investment without 
anticipating the resistance emerging among developing countries, NGOs as well as their own 
electorates. Recently, the wariness about new multilateral initiatives has mounted, especially in 
developing countries which are dissatisfied with the implementation of the results of the Uruguay 
Round. 
4.2  Multilateral Initiatives in the WTO 
The WTO initiatives that impact on foreign investment are largely contained in four agreements: 
Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
Trade Related Intellectual Properties (TRIPS) and Dispute Settlement Undertaking (DSU). While 
TRIPS and DSU provide minimal standards of protection for investment (Sauve 1998), the main 
provisions affecting investment are contained in TRIMS and GATS. 
The TRIMS measures are reasonably comprehensive in that they ban the imposition of performance 
requirements on foreign investors. This is not normally a part of  BITs, with the notable exception of 
those  BITs involving the United States (Vandevelde 1998; Read 1999)10F11. In addition, TRIMS 
includes “standstill” and “rollback” provisions. Countries are required to notify all non-conforming 
measures to the Council for Trade in Goods, and there is a commitment to roll back these measures in 
five years for developing countries and seven years for least developed countries. Article III of the 
agreement imposes national treatment on signatories, while Article XI forbids quantitative restrictions 
on exports and imports. It has been argued that TRIMS offers a natural base for consideration of a 
multilateral agreement on investment (Low and Subramaniam 1995; Hoekman and Saggi 2001). 
However, the principal problem with TRIMS is that it is restricted to trade in goods and does not cover 
services. Moreover, TRIMS rules have remained highly contentious and various WTO members 
appear to have violated them. 
Important measures for investor protection under the WTO are contained in GATS. To the extent 
that GATS covers FDI as a mode of supply (“commercial presence”) as well as the movement of 
related skilled personnel ("temporary movement of natural persons"), its provisions have a direct 
bearing on investment. Sauve (1998) argued that GATS contains “provisions relating both to matters 
of investment liberalisation and investment protection, albeit with different degrees of 
comprehensiveness”. While Article II(1) imposes MFN treatment (a measure of liberalization), 
transparency (indicating investment protection) across all sectors is required by Article III. However, 
GATS Article II(v) allows for exceptions to MFN. These exceptions relate mainly to regional trade 16 
   
arrangements (RTAs), bilateral tax treaties (DTs) and reasons of public health or morality. This is in 
conformity with most BITs. 
Likewise, national treatment is subject to limitations in GATS (Read 1999). National treatment is 
guaranteed only in service sectors listed in a member country's schedule (Article XVII(1)). The 
number of sectors where national treatment is granted is expected to increase over time in line with the 
'positive list' approach of GATS. In another clause, Article III(3) imposes 'transparency' on members 
who are required to publish and notify the Council for Trade in Services all laws, regulations and 
administrative measures relevant to the agreement in the case of committed service sectors (Read 
1999). 
According to Article XXIII, all disputes relating to GATS are to be governed by the Dispute 
Settlement Undertaking (DSU). The DSU contains the usual provisions for negotiations, consultations, 
arbitration and compensation (Sciarra 1998). However, unlike the NAFTA agreement, there is no 
provision for investor-state dispute settlement. 
Even though TRIMS and GATS offer a number of provisions relating to investment, the main 
lacunae are in the context of expropriation, compensation and subrogation (Read 1999). In addition, 
provisions for investor-state dispute settlement are missing. A multilateral agreement on investment 
might help fill these gaps. However, following this route involves several critical issues. First, in the 
case of commodity trade, it is easy to associate traded goods with particular countries. This is not 
always possible in the context of FDI, as the principal feature of transnational corporations is that their 
base of operations spans several countries. Second, multilateral attempts to constrain a country's 
sovereignty through redefinition of jurisdiction (as investor-state dispute settlement would do) would 
be as hotly contested by developed as developing countries. The concern is that this would confer 
advantages to foreign companies not available to local companies, which could be considered “reverse 
discrimination”. As we have seen earlier, this issue contributed to the breakdown of OECD talks on 
the MAI. Subsequently, we will discuss whether there are better prospects for a multilateral 
framework for investment in the context of WTO negotiations. 
 
  
5  Why a Multilateral Framework? 
5.1 Conflicting  Interests 
The earlier failure of OECD countries to conclude the MAI notwithstanding, industrialized 
countries, including the EU, are pressing for a multilateral agreement on investment to be integrated 
into the WTO framework. The negotiating stance of industrialized countries largely reflects the 
business perspective in these countries. For instance, according to UNCTAD (1999a: 140), the Union 
of Industrial and Employers Confederations in Europe (UNICE) “attached high priority to the 
establishment of a global regime for FDI that is non-discriminatory, transparent, stable and liberal”. 
UNICE claimed that appropriate provisions on FDI would be in the interest of WTO members at all 
levels of development. Likewise, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) argues that a single 
set of legally binding multilateral rules and disciplines to govern international investment is needed for 
two reasons: firstly to better protect the great volume of existing FDI and to facilitate further 
expansion; secondly to replace the large and rapidly growing number of overlapping legal instruments 
and initiatives in the investment area (DSE Forum 2002: 40 f.). 
A multilateral framework replacing the intricate net of bilateral and plurilateral rules would improve 
transparency and reduce FDI-related transaction costs. This could indeed be in the mutual interest of 
foreign investors and host countries. By rendering FDI more profitable, lower transaction costs may 17 
   
induce higher FDI flows from which host countries may derive benefits. In addition, foreign investors 
and host countries alike may gain from a less distorted allocation of FDI.11F12 While conclusive evidence 
on FDI diversion resulting from BITs is lacking (see Section 2), the complexity of the currently 
prevailing regulatory environment makes discriminatory practices more likely. Discrimination, which 
frequently invites bureaucratic interference and corruption, may hinder investors to enter superior 
locations and host countries to attract superior investments. 
Nevertheless, various developing countries remain skeptical whether they would benefit from a 
multilateral investment agreement. The fear is that the bargaining position of developing host 
countries would weaken further. As pointed out by Kokko (2002), the TRIMS agreement has already 
tilted the playing ground in favor of multinational enterprises (MNEs). While this agreement prohibits 
measures (e.g., performance requirements) traditionally applied to promote so-called development 
friendly FDI, it does not limit the scope for subsidy-based competition for FDI. A multilateral 
investment agreement aiming primarily at protecting existing FDI and encouraging additional FDI 
may shift the balance of power even more in favor of MNEs. 
Policymakers from developing countries emphasize the need to take due account of national 
development goals and policies in a multilateral investment agreement.12F13 This position is supported by 
many NGOs. UNCTAD (1999a: 140) summarizes their view as follows: 
“The main priority for international negotiations is not liberalization, but setting a 
framework to ensure that international investment promotes sustainable development and 
real economic efficiency. Specific priority areas for rules include investor behavior and 
transparency, competition and restrictive business practices, regulation of investment 
incentives, and support for least developed countries to enable them to attract high quality 
investment.” 
As it seems, conflicting interests are mainly between industrialized and developing countries. It fits 
into this picture that, for instance, the Minister of Small and Medium Enterprises and Commerce of 
Senegal argued for a “compromise between the investor and the receiving country in question” (DSE 
Forum 2002: 39). However, recent research on where the economic benefits of FDI go suggests that 
interests tend to diverge also among developing countries.  This is not only because some developing 
countries, notably those offering neither promising markets nor relevant cost advantages, may not 
have reasonable chances to attract FDI, no matter what investment agreement they sign. In addition, 
the bottom line of various empirical investigations appears to be that developing countries must have 
reached a minimum level of economic development before they can capture positive effects of inward 
FDI on economic growth.13F14 Higher-income developing countries have better prospects than low-
income countries to benefit from economic spillovers of FDI by absorbing superior technology and 
knowledge. Hence, more advanced developing countries may find it easier to accept, as a quid pro 
quo, the demands of MNEs and industrialized countries for clearly defined multilateral rules. By 
contrast, the cost-benefit calculus of poorer countries for which FDI has less to offer may lead them to 
reject such demands. 
The finding that beneficial effects of FDI in developing host countries cannot be taken for granted 
has further implications, which will be discussed in the remainder of Section 5. It is far from obvious 
that FDI would have more favorable effects in poor countries, if a “development clause” were to be 
included into a multilateral investment agreement. Similarly, it is open to question whether a 
"balanced" agreement, containing corporate obligations in addition to rules binding host countries, 
would foster transfers of technology and know-how. Strict obligations may rather discourage MNEs 
from investing in poor developing countries altogether. 
However, as argued in the following, wishful thinking also prevails on the part of those pushing for 
the liberalization of FDI regulations through a multilateral agreement. Cost savings are likely to be 
limited as a multilateral agreement would not replace, but rather complement bilateral and plurilateral 
agreements. Moreover, the importance of transaction costs, relative to other determinants of FDI in 
developing countries, tends to be overstated. As a consequence, it is unlikely that a multilateral 
agreement would induce significantly more FDI in developing countries. 18 
   
5.2  The Relevance of Transaction Costs 
A multilateral investment agreement could potentially reduce transaction costs related to FDI by 
providing for a transparent regime of rules and regulations. As argued in OECD (2002: 176 ff.), a lack 
of transparency may deter FDI in several ways: 
•  It adds to operational risks for MNEs and imposes higher information costs on them. 
•  It gives rise to information asymmetries which tend to benefit market incumbents and discourage 
FDI by new entrants. 
•  It may lead to adverse selection among foreign investors, by favoring those who possess 
privileged information and are politically well connected in the host country. 
An illustrative list of transaction costs caused by a lack of transparency in rules and regulations 
governing FDI has been presented by UNCTAD (1999a: 179 f.); this list, which largely applies to 
domestic investment as well, is shown in Table 1. The cost effects of lacking transparency in these 
respects are impossible to quantity. Yet, UNCTAD reckons that unclear rules and regulations “can 
increase the transaction costs of investment and operations significantly” (ibid.). In a similar vein, 
OECD (2002: 176) stresses that “a lack of transparency will almost certainly discourage foreign 
investors”, even though transparency per se will not induce FDI if other deterrents remain. To support 
this argument, OECD refers to a recent study by the Asian Development Bank Institute on various 
aspects of transparency in 55 (industrialized and developing) countries. It turns out that inward FDI is 
relatively low where transparency is poor. 
Nevertheless, the relevance of a multilateral agreement on investment for enhancing transparency 
and reducing transaction costs is questionable on several grounds. For a start, even if all transaction 
costs listed in Table 1 were addressed by such an agreement, other FDI-related transaction costs would 
remain unaffected. Hoekman and Saggi (2000: 643) argue in this context that “the major proportion of 
the transaction costs associated with FDI is likely to arise from differences in language, culture, 
politics, and the general business climate of a host country [rather than from the costs imposed by the 
multitude of BITs on multinational firms]”. 
Even for cost elements to be addressed in a multilateral agreement, reductions in transaction costs 
will be less than hoped for by the business community. A far-reaching multilateral agreement might 
render various less comprehensive BITs redundant. However, the Doha Round will at best mark the 
starting point of a long-term process towards substantive and binding multilateral investment rules. 
Most, if not all, bilateral and plurilateral investment agreements will remain in place for the time 
being. Investment agreements of different sorts with narrow or broad membership will coexist, as is 
the case in international trade.14F15 A multilateral agreement would define the smallest common 
denominator of WTO members, while regional groupings or bilateral partners would still be free to go 
beyond commonly agreed rules. In other words, the realistic scenario with regard to investment rules 
is what trade negotiators labelled a “GATT plus”-framework. 
The expected pattern of a “GATT plus” (or, rather, “WTO plus”)-type framework for international 
investment is easy to explain in collective action terms. The degree of common interests and 
perspectives is typically higher among a smaller homogenous group of countries; coordination 
problems mount with the number of contracting parties. It follows that more and stricter investment 
rules can be fixed in BITs and regional agreements. As Sauvant (2000: 9) put it, “what would be 
acceptable at the bilateral or even at the regional level may not necessarily be acceptable at the 
multilateral level.” The unpleasant consequence for foreign investors is that they will continue to 
encounter considerable information needs and transaction costs resulting from a lack of transparency, 
when planning to invest in a country which is WTO member and, at the same time, contracting party 
of more far-reaching investment agreements. The remaining complexity of trade regulations at 
different levels is a clear reminder to this effect. 
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Table 1:  Transaction Costs Related to the Legal and Regulatory Environment for FDI 
  Transaction Enterprise  exposure  Effects  on: 
Business entry  Registration  Monetary costs fo firm  Rate of new business entry 
  Licensing  Time costs (including   Distribution of firms by size,  
  Property rights    compliance and delays)    age, activity 
  Rules  Facilitation costs  Size of shadow economy 
  Clarity  Expert evaluations of rules  Rate of domestic investment 
  Predictability    and their functioning  FDI inflows, quantity and  
  Enforcement  Number of rules and     quality 
  Conflict resolution    formalities  Investment in R&D 
      
Business operation  Taxation  Cost of compliance  Business productivity 
  Trade-related regulation  Higher costs of operation  Export growth 
  Labor hiring/firing  Costs of conflicts and conflict  Size of shadow economy 
  Contracting    resolution  Growth of industries with  
  Logistics  Search costs and delays    specific assets or long- 
  Rules  Insufficient managerial     term contracting 
  Clarity    control  Rate of innovation and R&D 
  Predictability "Nuisance"  value  Rate of business expansion 
  Enforcement  Problems in making contracts  Rate of investment in new 
  Conflict resolution  Problems in delivery    equipment 
     Subcontracting 
      
Business exit  Bankruptcy  Rate of change of rules  Rate of exit (and entry) 
  Liquidation  Changes in costs and number  Prevalence of credit 
  Severance/layoffs    of rules  Distribution of profitability  
  Rules  Availability of rules and     of corporations 
  Clarity    documents to firms   
  Predictability  Rates of compliance and/or   
  Enforcement    evasion   
  Conflict resolution  Use of alternatives to formal   
     institutions   
Source: UNCTAD (1999a: 179 f.) on the basis of World Bank information. 
It may actually be the foreign investors themselves who will contribute to the emergence of a 
“WTO plus”-framework. This could happen if, as widely assumed, multilateral negotiations on 
investment strengthened the bargaining position of developing countries. As a consequence, the 
business community may lose interest in a multilateral agreement, and instead prefer the stronger 
protection of investors' rights in BITs (World Bank 2003: 127). 
5.3  Transaction Costs and Inward FDI 
There is another reason for not expecting too much from a multilateral investment agreement in terms 
of transaction cost reductions. Survey results on investment conditions in 28 developing countries, 
presented by the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT 2000) in cooperation with the United 
Nations and the International Chamber of Commerce, suggest that impediments to FDI that give rise 
to transaction costs have already been relaxed substantially, largely on a unilateral basis, throughout 
the 1990s.15F16 It is, thus, debatable whether a multilateral agreement is needed as urgently as suggested 
by statements on the significance of transaction costs made by the business community.16F17 20 
   
ERT (2000) lists country-wise impediments to FDI on a scale ranging from 0 (most liberal) to 6 
(most restrictive). In this section, we consider impediments that give rise to transaction costs (see Box 
3 for details). These impediments are grouped into five indices: administrative bottlenecks, entry 
restrictions, post-entry restrictions, risk factors and technology-related regulations. Table 2 indicates 
that transaction costs have come down considerably in all five dimensions, if ERT's assessment of the 
severity of FDI impediments provides a reasonable yardstick: 
•  In the early 1990s already, the average score of all sample countries was below 2 (i.e., fairly 
liberal) in all dimensions except for entry restrictions. 
•  As concerns changes between 1992 and 1999, just eight out of 140 country-specific entries in 
Table 2 point to higher transaction costs at the end of the observation period. 
•  For only two countries (Guatemala and Sri Lanka), FDI impediments were rated more restrictive 
in 1999 in more than one dimension. 
•  The average score of all sample countries declined to about half the score in 1992 for each of the 
five indices. 
All this suggests that foreign investors do not  have not to wait for a multilateral agreement on 
investment in order to benefit from transaction cost reductions. This applies especially to some 
specific factors that figured prominently among investors' concerns in the more distant past. Relevant 
examples are the risk of nationalization or expropriation (subsumed under risk factors in Table 2) and 
exit restrictions, including restrictions on the repatriation of capital (subsumed under post-entry 
restrictions in Table 2). According to the survey results of ERT, the threat of nationalizations or 
expropriations has diminished tremendously. The number of sample countries where it was considered 
relevant at all declined from 13 in 1992 to 5 in 1999 (among them India and China, though their score 
of 0.5 indicated a fairly low risk of expropriation). A similar move towards liberalization is reported 
for exit restrictions; in this regard, India's score improved from 2 in 1992 to 1 in 1999 (China: 2 in 
1992 versus 0.5 in 1999). A multilateral agreement may help lock in previous liberalization measures 
undertaken unilaterally, and render such measures more difficult to reverse. However, there appears to 
be little a multilateral agreement can offer in terms of further reducing the risk of expropriation and 
liberalizing exit restrictions. 
Correlation and regression analyses that we performed on the link between the indicator values 
presented in Table 2 and inward FDI in the sample countries support the view that transaction cost-
related impediments to FDI were of minor importance in the past already.17F18 For a start, we calculated 
bivariate (Spearman rank) correlation coefficients between the indices in Table 2 on the one hand, and 
FDI stocks in 1999 and FDI inflows in 1997–2000 on the other hand.18F19 
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Box 3 
Survey Results by the European Round Table of Industrialists on Impediments to FDI Giving 
Rise to Transaction Costs 
Comparable survey results are available from ERT (2000) for 28 developing countries and the years 1992, 1996 
and 1999. We draw on ERT findings for the first and the final year. The checklist of ERT covers 33 items, 
ranging from restrictions on overall management control and freedom of decision of private investors to 
criminality and civil disturbances in the sample countries. We focus on those impediments that give rise to 
transaction costs. 
We consider the following ERT items and aggregate them into five indices, by averaging survey results on 
specific items: 
1.  administrative bottlenecks 
•  inefficient administration and red tape 
2.  entry restrictions 
•  ownership restrictions: mandatory state or local partnership; limitations related to industrial property 
and land; 
•  access to sectors and activities: industries reserved for the state or local enterprises; restrictions related 
to acquisition of existing enterprises; minimum investment requirements; 
•  approval procedures: discrimination against private business or FDI; complex procedures; rapidly 
expiring licenses; red tape. 
3.  post-entry restrictions 
•  management control/freedom of decision: political pressure on management; discretionary state 
intervention; 
•  performance requirements: requirements with regard to exports, local content and manufacturing; 
foreign exchange neutrality; import and local sales licenses depending on export performance; 
•  foreign exchange transactions: restrictions with regard to profit remittances, import financing and 
payment of fees; delays imposed on transfers; additional taxation of remittances; 
•  exit restrictions: restrictions on repatriation of capital; 
•  price controls: freezing prices and/or wages; 
•  marketing and distribution: interference in the structure of sales organizations and product distribution. 
4.  risk factors 
•  inconsistent, unclear and/or erratic regulations; 
•  risk of nationalization or expropriation; 
•  shortcomings in legal and regulatory systems; 
•  political instability; 
•  environmental risks (e.g., contingent liabilities for previous environmental damage); 
•  high rates of criminality; 
•  civil disturbances and violence. 
5.  technology-related regulations 
•  intellectual property protection: insufficient protection for patents, copyrights, trademarks etc.; no, 
insufficient or highly taxed remuneration for brand use, technical assistance and technology transferred; 
•  technology targeting: interventions into corporate technology transfers; pressure to dissipate a 
company's R&D efforts; insistence on local R&D. 
Some of the specific items will be considered separately in Section 6 on performance requirements. It should 
also be noted that the assessment of FDI impediments, especially the weighting done by ERT, may be rather 
subjective. This drawback which is common to surveys, has to be accepted in the absence of hard (quantitative) 
data. Moreover, it is foreign investors who take locational decisions so that ERT is probably best qualified to 
assess the restrictiveness of FDI impediments in potential host countries. 
Source: ERT (2000); Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2002). 
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Table 2: Transaction Cost-Related Impediments to FDI in 28 Developing Countriesa 1992 and 1999 
 Administrative 
bottlenecks 
Entry restrictions Post-entry 
restrictions 
Risk factors  Technology-related 
regulations 
  1992  1999 1992 1999 1992 1999 1992 1999  1992  1999 
Argentina 0.5  0.5  0.7  0  0.6 0.3 0.1  0  1.0  0.5 
Bangladesh  2.0  1.5 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.4  2.0  1.0 
Brazil  1.0  0 1.3 0.7 1.2 0.3 0.7 0.2  2.5  0.5 
China  3.0  2.0 3.7 2.7 3.3 2.4 1.6 0.9  2.5  1.3 
Colombia  2.0  0 2.5 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.3  2.0  2.0 
Ecuador  1.0  1.5 2.0 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.1  1.0  0.8 
Egypt  2.0  2.0 3.0 1.8 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.1  2.0  1.3 
Ghana  2.0  0 3.0 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.1  1.0  0.3 
Guatemala  0  0 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.6  1.5  0.8 
India  3.0  1.0 2.3 1.3 1.5 0.9 1.4 0.4  2.5  2.3 
Indonesia  2.0  0 3.3 1.2 1.5 0.3 1.1 0.4  2.0  0.8 
Iran  3.0  1.0 3.8 2.7 2.4 1.8 1.3 0.3  2.5  2.0 
Kenya  2.0  1.0 2.3 1.3 1.7 0.2 0.7 0.7  1.5  0.8 
Korea,  Rep.  1.0  0 3.3 1.2 1.3 0.5 0.6 0.3  2.5  1.3 
Malaysia  0  0 2.8 2.0 1.8 1.0 0.4  0  2.5  3.0 
Mexico  1.0  1.0 3.0 0.5 1.3 0.2 0.4 0.3  1.0  0.5 
Nigeria  3.0  2.5 3.3 1.0 2.2 0.5 1.9 0.8  2.5  1.5 
Pakistan 2.0  1.0  1.3  0  1.3 1.3 0.8 0.6  1.5  1.3 
Philippines  1.0  2.0 2.2 1.2 1.7 0.8 1.1 0.3  2.5  1.0 
Saudi  Arabia  0  0 3.2 3.3 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.1  1.8  1.0 
Sri  Lanka  1.0  1.0 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.3  0 0.6  0  1.0 
Syrian Arab. Rep.  3.0  2.0  3.0 1.7 2.8 1.5 1.7 0.9  1.5  0.3 
Taiwan  0  0 2.0 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.1  2.5  1.8 
Thailand  0  0 4.0 1.5 1.0 0.6 2.3 0.3  1.5  0.3 
Tunisia  1.0  0 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.1  2.5  1.0 
Turkey  3.0  2.0 2.3 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3  2.5  1.5 
Vietnam  3.0  1.0 3.8 1.8 2.3 0.9 1.6 0.4  3.0  2.5 
Zimbabwe  3.0  2.0 3.0 1.5 1.8 0.3 1.7 1.1  1.5  0.3 
               
Average 28 DCs  1.6  0.9  2.5  1.3 1.4 0.7 0.9 0.4  1.9  1.1 
aSurvey results ranging from 0 (most liberal) to 6 (most restrictive); see Box 3 for a more detailed description of survey items 
and aggregation into indices. 
Source: ERT (2000). 
The first two columns of Table 3 suggest that more serious administrative bottlenecks and higher 
risks discouraged inward FDI in a significant way. However, inward FDI was not correlated 
significantly with either entry restrictions, post-entry restrictions, or technology-related regulations.19F20 
This provides a first indication that the distribution of FDI among developing countries was shaped by 
locational factors other than transaction costs captured by these three FDI impediments. For instance, 
per-capita FDI stocks in 1999 were highest in Malaysia among all sample countries, even though this 
country was rated relatively restrictive with regard to entry conditions and technology-related 
regulations. 
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Table 3:   Transaction Cost-Related FDI Impediments and Inward FDI: Correlation and Regression Results 
FDI impedimentsa bivariate  correlationsb partial  correlation  coefficientsc 
  FDI stocks in 1999  FDI flows in 1997–
2000 
FDI stocks in 1999  FDI flows in 1997–
2000 
administrative bottlenecks  –0.53***  –0.39**  –0.23  –0.17 
entry restrictions  –0.09  –0.01  –0.10  –0.17 
post-entry  restrictions –0.01 0.04  –0.11  –0.18 
risk factors  –0.62***  –0.54***  –0.24  –0.03 
technology-related regulations –0.01  0.02  0.07  –0.12 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively (two-tailed). 
aAs of 1999 for correlations with FDI stocks; as of 1996 for correlations with FDI flows. – bSpearman rank correlation 
coefficients; inward FDI in US-Dollar per capita of the sample countries' population. – cSee text for underlying regression 
and calculation procedure; inward FDI in million US-Dollar. 
Source: Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2002). 
 
The minor importance of transaction costs, as reflected in the indices on FDI impediments, is borne 
out more clearly once we control for market-related determinants of FDI in developing countries. In a 
simple multivariate regression analysis, we examined whether transaction cost-related impediments 
provide explanatory power for the distribution of FDI over and above the host countries' population 
and GDP per capita. We ran a regression of log FDI (flows and stocks, respectively, in million US-
Dollar) on log population, log GDP per capita and each of the five indices on FDI impediments.20F21 The 
two market-related determinants of FDI turned out to be highly significant in all regressions.21F22 The t-
values of these regressions were then used to calculate the partial correlation coefficients of each index 
on transaction cost-related FDI impediments with both, FDI stocks and FDI flows. All  partial 
correlation coefficients are insignificant (see the third and fourth column of Table 3). This implies that 
even the role of administrative bottlenecks and risk factors in explaining the distribution of FDI among 
developing countries is small at best, if market-related variables are controlled for. 
Our findings underscore the view of Hoekman and Saggi (2000: 642 f.) and Singh (2001), who 
consider transaction costs to be a weak argument for a multilateral agreement on investment. 
Furthermore, as argued before, it is far from clear that transaction costs would be substantially lower 
than under current conditions in the counterfactual situation of a multilateral investment agreement. Of 
course, it cannot be ruled out that FDI in developing countries would have been still higher if 
multilateral rules had existed. Yet it should be noted that the boom of FDI in developing countries 
occurred without a multilateral investment agreement (Singh 2001), and some countries, notably 
China and Malaysia, attracted enormous amounts of FDI despite their relatively restrictive investment 
regimes. 
5.4  Developing Countries’ Demands for Flexible Rules and Corporate Obligations 
According to Singh (2001), the attractiveness to FDI of countries such as China and Malaysia also 
proves the case for flexible investment rules, which would allow for selectivity of developing host 
countries in targeting and regulating inward FDI. A strict application of WTO principles such as 
national treatment and MFN to FDI is deemed harmful by this author  to economic development in the 
Third World. It is for several reasons that developing countries are urged to monitor and regulate the 24 
   
amount, structure and timing of FDI: (i) to avoid financial fragility, (ii) to prevent crowding-out of 
domestic investment, and (iii) to promote economic development by technology transfers and 
economic spillovers. 
Likewise, the request for a balanced multilateral agreement to include corporate obligations is 
meant to improve the developmental impact of FDI in the Third World. Corporate obligations are 
considered a vital element of a multilateral agreement, as MNEs “often only aimed at maximizing 
their own profits” (DSE Forum 2002: 39). The profit motive of MNEs may conflict with development 
needs of the host countries of FDI and, thus, provides a rationale for restrictive FDI policies if market 
failure is prevalent: “Since multinational firms typically arise in oligopolistic industries, the presence 
of imperfect competition in the host country is an obvious candidate” (Hoekman and Saggi 2000: 
632). 
It is mainly with regard to corporate obligations that developing countries may achieve a better deal 
by negotiating multilaterally on investment. As noted in Section 2, BITs typically do not include 
provisions against restrictive business practices. Bargaining asymmetries will be easier to overcome if 
the request for corporate obligations is coordinated among developing countries. The wish-list of 
multilateral rules on corporate behavior includes the following (for details, see CUTS 2001; 2002): 
•  observance of human rights, labor rights and environmental protection ("Global Compact"); 
•  corporate disclosure and accountability; 
•  respect for national laws; 
•  social responsibility, e.g., with regard to illicit payments and product safety; 
•  transparency in transfer pricing; 
•  precautions against restrictive, abusive and unfair business practices (e.g., market segmentation, 
discriminatory pricing, collusion, exclusive dealing); 
•  promotion of technological dissemination, local entrepreneurship and local workers. 
Even though it was for good reasons that developing countries have resisted linking trade with labor 
and environmental standards and human rights, they would now like to have binding rules on 
corporate behavior in these respects. Previously established guidelines and codes of conduct are 
dismissed as insufficient. Similar to restricting incentives-based competition for FDI (see Section 7 
below), however, the real challenge is enforceability. The critique leveled against non-binding 
guidelines, that they have little impact on corporate behavior, may apply to binding rules, too, unless 
they can be enforced effectively. 
In essence, developing countries demand more flexible rules with regard to their own behavior and 
more binding rules with regard to corporate behavior in order to improve the developmental impact of 
FDI. Developing countries may be tempted to dismiss the opposition of industrialized countries and 
MNEs against these demands by pointing to the selfishness of opponents in the political bargaining 
process. Yet, developing countries should take into account that their demands also give rise to some 
economic questions. In the subsequent paragraphs, we address possible trade-offs and opportunity 
costs, and discuss the effectiveness of “development clauses” in a multilateral investment agreement. 
Possible trade-offs are twofold. First, the required flexibility of rules on FDI policies by host 
countries comes at the cost of transparency and predictability. According to Sauvant (2000: 10), a 
balance has to be achieved: “On the one hand, it is unavoidable that any international agreement – 
almost by definition – establishes certain obligations that reduce the freedom of action for any 
signatory and that, on the other hand, the distinct and specific needs of any particular country to 
promote its own development objectives in light of its own situation need to be taken into account.” In 
striking this balance, negotiators should be aware that the transaction-cost argument, discussed in the 
previous section, might become irrelevant altogether if rules were to become rather flexible. Put 
differently, reductions in transaction costs will be the less, the more flexible rules become. 
Second, while corporate obligations can only have an impact on the quality of inward FDI if they 
are binding and enforceable,22F23 strict obligations may reduce the quantity of inward FDI. Foreign 
investors are always free  not to invest if profit opportunities are considered poor in the light of 
obligations to be fulfilled. This might not be a problem for recipient countries if only “development-
unfriendly” FDI projects were discouraged in this way. It cannot be ruled out, however, that foreign 25 
   
investors would generally become more reluctant. Almost by definition, the profits of MNEs and, thus, 
their incentive to undertake FDI will decline to the extent that developing countries succeed in shifting 
rents from MNEs to host countries by imposing binding obligations on the former. 
Likewise, the effectiveness of flexible rules and “development clauses” cannot be taken for granted. 
The special treatment developing countries were granted in trade is a clear reminder in this regard.23F24 
Trade preferences traditionally rule the way many developing countries perceive the GATT/WTO, 
even though they “did little for the poor countries” (Bhagwati 2002: 27).24F25 The economic results from 
special treatment in trade have been “disenchanting” (Langhammer 1999: 21) according to several 
studies. Well-intended as they were, trade preferences did the poorest WTO members no good in 
promoting their world-market integration. Rather, the special treatment appears to have discouraged 
African countries, for example, from actively participating in trade negotiations by committing 
themselves to binding trade liberalization (ibid.). As a result, African markets are still most heavily 
protected. Another consequence was that developing countries insisting on preferential treatment were 
no relevant negotiation partners for industrialized countries in various trade rounds: “The rich 
countries, denied reciprocal concessions from the poor countries, wound up concentrating on 
liberalising trade in products of interest largely to themselves” (Bhagwati 2002: 26). The implication 
for multilateral negotiations on investment is fairly obvious: It is rather unlikely that developing 
countries can achieve much, e.g. with regard to binding corporate obligations, if they are not prepared 
to constrain flexibility on their own part. 
Besides quid pro quo-considerations in the political bargaining process, it should be taken into 
account that market failure provides a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for flexible rules to be 
effective in promoting development-friendly FDI in developing countries. Hoekman and Saggi (2000: 
636), though acknowledging the relevance of market failure, emphasize that “in practice it is rather 
difficult to design strategic [FDI] policies that are effective. The informational requirements for 
formulating a successful policy are substantial and such policies invite lobbying and other socially-
wasteful activities. ... The best rule of thumb for policy-makers is to refrain from pursuing strategic 
policies.” 
The general skepticism of these authors on whether flexibility and selectivity will help promote 
development-friendly FDI may be specified in several respects.25F26 For instance, developing countries 
in Asia (e.g., Korea and Taiwan) chose to restrict FDI and instead to rely on domestic investors in 
technologically advanced industries, in order to strengthen local technological capabilities. According 
to UNCTAD (1999a: 173), selective FDI policies paid off in some of these countries; “in many cases, 
however, the emergence of successful domestic producers in a new, technologically-advanced industry 
is unlikely or might take a long time with uncertain results. An example of a costly intervention in 
favour of domestic firms in high-technology industries is the Brazilian informatics policy of the early 
1980s, which involved restrictions on FDI.” 
In other words, it cannot be simply assumed, as in Singh (2001), that some success stories of 
flexible and selective FDI policies could be easily copied by all developing countries. Poor developing 
countries in particular, may lack administrative capabilities to effectively screen FDI and channel 
foreign investors into activities which foster national economic development. Government failure may 
then hamper economic development even more seriously than market failure. 
Finally, in the course of time, selective FDI policies may turn out to be less successful than first-
round effects suggest. The empirical results of Agosin and Mayer (2000) on FDI-induced crowding-
out and crowding-in of domestic investment provide an example. According to Singh (2001), the 
findings of these authors strengthen the case for selective FDI policies, as crowding-in was observed 
in Asian countries with less liberal FDI policies, whereas crowding-out prevailed in more liberal Latin 
America. This misses a point made in a recent OECD study: “Crowding out of domestic investment 
through FDI may not necessarily be a problem, and can even be a healthy sign” (OECD 2002: 64). 
The host economy may benefit if local enterprises lacking competitiveness are replaced by foreign 
firms, provided that released domestic resources are used for more productive purposes. With 
hindsight, it might have been not so bad after all if Asian governments had allowed MNEs to 
outcompete local firms; this might have helped prevent over-investment in unproductive activities. 26 
   
6 Performance  Requirements: Making a Fuss about a Minor Problem? 
Conflicts of interest between developing and developed countries appear to be particularly 
pronounced with regard to performance requirements. Developed countries are widely expected to 
intensify pressure on developing countries to abolish performance requirements when it comes to 
multilateral negotiations on investment. Taking further into account that many BITs do not prohibit 
performance requirements, it is less likely than noted before in the context of corporate obligations 
that developing countries will achieve a better deal on performance requirements in multilateral 
negotiations. In other words, multilateral negotiations may improve the bargaining position of 
developing countries in some respects, but not necessarily in all respects. As a matter of fact , the 
resistance of developing countries to enter into multilateral negotiations under the WTO umbrella 
seems to be largely because they regard performance requirements as an essential means to improve 
the “quality” of FDI inflows. 
The opposing objectives of developing and industrialized countries and the ensuing controversy 
suggest that performance requirements are widely used and considered a major bottleneck to FDI by 
multinational enterprises. All the more surprisingly, OECD (2002: 185) notes: “Little concrete 
evidence is available to shed light on the pervasiveness of performance requirements.” Under the 
TRIMS agreement which prohibits certain types of performance requirements (e.g. export restrictions, 
trade-balancing requirements and local content obligations), only 26 countries had notified 
performance requirements that did not conform with this agreement, and many of these requirements 
have since been repealed (OECD 2002). On the other hand, notifications may seriously underreport 
the actual use of TRIMs, which is now one of the implementation issues in the Doha agenda.26F27 
Survey data on investment conditions in 28 developing countries, presented in ERT (2000), indicate 
that both the proponents and the critics of performance requirements miss an important point: The 
implicit assumption made on both sides of the debate, namely that performance requirements are 
highly relevant, seems to be in conflict with the available evidence. 
The ERT-survey covers various aspects of investment conditions in the 28 sample countries. The 
following three items, included in the checklist, are of particular interest in the present context:27F28 
•  performance requirements related to exports, local content, manufacturing and foreign exchange 
neutrality (including requirements that are not codified); 
•  requirements related to employment conditions (discrimination of foreign investors against 
comparable local employers) and work-permits for international staff; 
•  technology targeting, i.e., interventions into the corporate transfer of technology and insistence on 
R&D efforts in the host country and R&D dissipation. 
For each of these items, ERT (2000) lists country-wise impediments to FDI on a scale ranging from 
0 (most liberal) to 6 (most restrictive). As mentioned in Section 5.3, the scoring may be criticized for 
the subjectivity involved and the limited number of host countries under consideration. Moreover, 
restrictive performance requirements tend to be concentrated in some industries such as automobile 
production. Nevertheless, Table 4, which presents the results for 1992 and 1999, i.e., the first and the 
final year for which comparable surveys are available, reveals some interesting insights. Even in the 
early 1990s, the restrictiveness of performance requirements was considered rather low for the average 
of all sample countries; the average score was below 2 in 1992 already. Moreover, the average score 
declined significantly during the 1990s, indicating a relaxation of performance requirements in all 
three dimensions. Performance requirements became less restrictive in almost all sample countries.28F29 
Specific exceptions are: employment requirements in Nigeria and Zimbabwe, and technology targeting 
in China. 27 
   
Table 4:   FDI Impediments Related to Performance Requirements in 28 Developing Countries
a 1992 and 1999 
 






  1992 1999 1992 1999 1992 1999 
Argentina 1  0.5  0.5  0.5  0  0 
Bangladesh  1 0 3 3 1  0.5 
Brazil  0.5  0 1 1 2 0 
China  4 3.5  2.5 2  0 0.5 
Colombia  1 1 1  0.5  1 1 
Ecuador  1 1 0 0 0 0 
Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  2 1 3 2 0 0 
Ghana  1 0 2  1.5  1 0 
Guatemala  1 0 2 1 0 0 
India  1.5  1 3 2 0 0 
Indonesia  3 0 2 1 0 0 
Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  3 3 3 1 0 0 
Kenya  2 0 0 0 0 0 
Korea,  Rep.  0 0 1 0 2 0 
Malaysia  3  2.5  2 2 2 2 
Mexico  2 0 2 1 0 0 
Nigeria  3 0.5 2 2.5 0  0 
Pakistan  3 3 2 0 0 0 
Philippines  2 1 2 0 2 0 
Saudi  Arabia  0 0 2 1 0 0 
Sri  Lanka  2 1 0 0 0 0 
Syrian  Arab  Rep.  2 2 3 2 3 0 
Taiwan  1 1 1 0 1 1 
Thailand  2 1 2 0 0 0 
Tunisia  0 0 3  1.5  3 0 
Turkey  0 0 1 0 0 0 
Viet  Nam  0 0 2  1.5  1 1 
Zimbabwe  3 0 0 1 0 0 
Average  28  DCs  1.6 0.8 1.7 1.0 0.7 0.2 
Coefficient of variation
b  0.7 1.2 0.6 0.9 1.4 2.2 
aSurvey results ranging from 0 (most liberal) to 6 (most restrictive); see text for a more detailed description of survey items. 
– bStandard deviation divided by mean. 
Source: ERT (2000). 
More surprisingly perhaps, a (Spearman rank) correlation analysis does not support the proposition 
that more restrictive performance requirements tend to discourage FDI in a significant way. For lack 
of sectorally disaggregated data on performance requirements and FDI in the sample countries, we 
correlate performance requirements as given in Table 4 with overall (inward) FDI stocks per capita of 
the host countries’ population.29F30 The correlation coefficients shown in Table 5 are statistically 
insignificant, which is in conflict with the proposition underlying the negotiating stance of developed 
countries in the WTO. For technology targeting, the coefficients even reveal a positive correlation 
with FDI stocks.30F31 Although the evidence is admittedly weak, the most heavily disputed performance 
requirements related to exports, local content, manufacturing production and foreign exchange 
neutrality may have become less relevant as a hindrance to FDI during the 1990s. 28 
   
Table 5:  Performance Requirementsa and Inward FDI Stocksb: Spearman Rank Correlation Results across 28 Developing 
Countries 1992 and 1999 






  1992 
FDI stocks, 1992  –0.23  –0.12  0.12 
  1999 
FDI stocks, 1999  –0.10  –0.15  0.18 
 
aAccording to Table 4. – bUS-Dollar per capita of the host countries' population. 
Source: Own calculations based on Table 4 and UNCTAD online data base. 
These findings seem to strengthen the case of developing countries attempting to improve the 
“quality” of FDI inflows by insisting on performance requirements. As it seems, the costs of doing so, 
in terms of a lower quantity of inward FDI, are marginal at most. Before drawing such a conclusion, 
however, two issues have to be taken into account. First, it is open to debate if (and which) 
performance requirements actually help improve the “quality” of FDI. Second, there may be other 
costs involved, notably special incentives granted to foreign investors, which compensate for 
restrictive performance requirements and, therefore, prevent FDI from falling. These issues are 
discussed in the remainder of this section. 
Performance requirements are designed by host countries to enhance the benefits and minimize the 
costs of FDI (OECD 2002: 185). For example, local content requirements are regarded as an important 
means to strengthen economic links between foreign and local producers and, thereby, create local 
employment opportunities as well as technological spillovers (Kumar 2001). Requirements related to 
local content, exports and foreign exchange neutrality are intended to reduce the risk that FDI leads to 
a deterioration of the current account. And mandatory technology transfers may help promote the 
development of an indigenous industry that is competitive internationally. 
Some proponents of performance requirements tend to take it for granted that reasonable 
development objectives will be achieved in this way (e.g., Kumar 2001; Singh 2001). The detailed 
account  by Moran (1998) of host-country policies to shape foreign investor activities portrays a 
differentiated picture. In a summary paper, this author draws the following conclusions (Moran 1999): 
Export performance requirements have encouraged the integration of foreign affiliates into the global 
operations of their parent companies and have, thus, helped economic development of host countries. 
By contrast, FDI is found harmful to the growth and welfare of developing host countries when 
foreign investors are sheltered from competition in the host-country market and burdened with high 
domestic content, mandatory joint venture and technology-sharing requirements. 
Likewise, a recent OECD study provides little comfort to those supposing that performance 
requirements are generally in the interest of developing countries (OECD 2002: 185 ff.). The relevant 
literature, summarized in this study, rather suggests that the development impact of performance 
requirements varies across countries, sectors and motives for FDI. Similar to Moran (1998), the case 
for export requirements is considered stronger than the case for local content requirements. The former 
can play a crucial role in pushing multinational enterprises to integrate their affiliates in developing 
countries more closely into corporate sourcing networks,31F32 and may counteract the “high incidence of 
restrictive clauses imposed by MNEs on [the export activities of] their local affiliates” (Kumar 2001: 
3153, with regard to India). By contrast, local content requirements tend to protect inefficient local 
producers. Foreign investors who are forced to use inputs that are not up to world-market standards 
suffer cost increases and impaired international competitiveness. As a consequence, local content 
requirements may backfire on export objectives. OECD (2002: 192) concludes that the record for 29 
   
performance requirements in achieving development objectives is “less than encouraging”. In an 
earlier survey on the diffusion of technological know-how of foreign investors, Blomström and Kokko 
(1997) found that local competence and a competitive environment tend to be more important than 
technology transfer requirements for achieving productivity benefits from FDI. 
As concerns the economic costs of performance requirements, incentives granted to foreign 
investors by host country governments have to be taken into account. If multinational enterprises 
undertake FDI in spite of performance requirements, this may be because they perceive such 
requirements as a quid pro quo for compensatory advantages offered by the host country (OECD 
2002: 187).32F33 Compensatory incentives may have prevented adverse consequences of performance 
requirements on the quantity of inward FDI, but tend to involve economic costs in terms of allocative 
distortions and/or budgetary strains. Allocative distortions are likely, if foreign investors are granted 
privileged access to protected host-country markets and local resources (e.g., raw materials). For 
example, FDI in various Latin American countries was traditionally concentrated in sophisticated 
manufacturing industries in which host countries lacked comparative advantage (Nunnenkamp 1997). 
Import protection supported high rates of return so that the efficiency and international 
competitiveness of market-seeking FDI was not a major concern of foreign investors (UNCTAD 
1998a: 253). 
More apparent costs arise when fiscal and financial incentives are granted to foreign investors as a 
quid pro quo for performance requirements. FDI in the automobile industry of various countries 
provides a case in point. As noted in OECD (2002: 186 f.), local content requirements are widely used 
in this industry. At the same time, host country governments incurred huge fiscal or financial costs to 
attract FDI in the automobile industry. Oman (2001: 69) presents data, gathered from unofficial 
sources, according to which “the direct cost of financial and fiscal subsidies paid by governments 
(predominantly sub-national governments) to attract FDI in major automobile factories rose 
substantially over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, and amounted to hundreds of thousands of 
dollars per job-to-be-created in countries as diverse as Brazil, Germany, India, Portugal and the United 
States.” 
In conclusion, the issue of performance requirements must not be considered in isolation. 
Performance requirements are not to be recommended, unless they help achieve development 
objectives and the direct and indirect costs involved do not exceed the benefits. Incentives-based 
competition for FDI, an issue to which we turn next, may be particularly perilous for developing 
countries lacking the financial means to compete successfully with developed countries. All this is 
underlying the suggestion, e.g. by Moran (1999), that developing countries might offer to refrain from 
performance requirements in exchange for a commitment of developed countries to refrain from 
incentives-based competition for FDI.33F34 
7  Incentives-based Competition for FDI 
Comprehensive statistics on the use and significance of FDI incentives do not exist. That is why the 
World Bank (2003: 118) considers it of high priority for international collaboration to systematically 
compile information on FDI incentives. For obvious reasons, however, neither the governments that 
offer incentives nor the investors who receive them are willing to disclose the amount of incentives 
(Oman 2001). Most of the relevant literature on FDI incentives refers to the limited evidence presented 
by UNCTAD (e.g., Moran 1998; Kumar 2001; Kokko 2002). This evidence allows the following 
conclusions: 
•  Major FDI projects involved subsidies amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars per job-to-
be created. 
•  Both developed and developing countries engaged in incentives-based competition; "bidding 
wars" frequently involved local and provincial authorities. 30 
   
•  Incentives-based competition has increased considerably since the mid-1980s. More than 100 
countries provided various FDI incentives in the mid-1990s. In recent years, few countries appear 
to have competed for FDI without any form of subsidies. 
•  Financial incentives are common in developed countries, while incentive schemes in developing 
countries are often based on tax holidays and other fiscal measures that do not require direct 
payments of scarce public funds. 
•  FDI incentives appear to be concentrated in some technologically advanced industries such as 
automobiles, petrochemicals and electronics. 
•  Incentive packages are offered particularly for large, “high-visibility” projects. 
The economic justification of FDI incentives depends on whether they are (i) effective in increasing 
the amount of FDI inflows and (ii) efficient in that the costs of providing incentives do not exceed the 
benefits to the host country.34F35 The effectiveness of FDI incentives was considered highly questionable 
by most economists in the past (Oman 2001; Nunnenkamp 2001a). However, Kokko (2002) argues 
that globalization has made incentives a more important determinant of international investment 
decisions; this author refers to recent surveys and econometric studies supporting this view.35F36 
The strongest efficiency argument in favor of FDI incentives is based on prospects for economic 
spillovers. Foreign firms often command over superior technology and knowledge. Local firms may 
benefit from productivity-enhancing externalities or spillovers, e.g., through forward or backward 
linkages with foreign firms. Such spillovers do not enter the private cost-benefit calculus of foreign 
firms. Hence, FDI tends to be less than is optimal from the host country perspective. FDI incentives 
can bridge the gap between private and social returns. It follows that the efficiency of FDI incentives 
depends on the significance of spillovers. 
The empirical evidence on spillovers is mixed. Kokko (2002: 5) summarizes as follows: “There is 
strong evidence pointing to the potential for significant spillover benefits from FDI, but also ample 
evidence indicating that spillovers do not occur automatically.” Hence, the efficiency of FDI 
incentives is not obvious, and systematic differences between countries are to be expected. Hoekman 
and Saggi (2000: 638) conclude that "the elusive nature of spillovers makes it difficult to justify the 
use of investment incentives on the scale they are being used today". 
From a developing country perspective, the efficiency of FDI incentives deserves particular 
attention, when defining their negotiation stance on multilateral investment rules.  Even though the 
potential for FDI-induced catching-up processes should, in principle, be inversely related to the per-
capita income of host countries, it would be wrong to conclude that the efficiency of FDI incentives is 
highest in low-income countries. The available evidence rather suggests that productivity-enhancing 
spillovers materialize only if the host country has reached a threshold of sufficient local capabilities to 
absorb superior technologies and knowledge of foreign investors.36F37 This implies that FDI incentives 
amount to a waste of scarce public resources in many poor developing countries. 
Especially where FDI incentives are difficult to justify economically, the pervasiveness of 
incentives is probably largely due to political considerations. FDI incentives are politically attractive: 
Host country governments can point to visible results of their promotional efforts when an FDI project 
is attracted by granting incentives, whereas the costs of incentives are typically widely spread and 
hardly visible. There is, thus, a built-in bias towards offering overly generous incentives. In other 
words, politically motivated competition for FDI tends to raise incentive levels and shifts benefits 
from host countries to foreign investors (Haaland and Wooton 1999). It is precisely the lack of 
transparency which renders incentives-based competition for FDI problematic. Secrecy creates 
“significant possibilities for graft, corruption and many other types of rent-seeking behaviour” (Oman 
2001: 79). 
The “race to the top” in offering FDI incentives is difficult to stop, even though the economic case 
for not taking part in incentives-based competition may be strong. Politically, it may not be feasible to 
withdraw incentives unilaterally. Even if economic fundamentals of host countries remain a more 
important pull factor of FDI inflows, incentives can make a difference in an investor's final locational 
choice among short-listed countries with similarly favorable fundamentals (Oman 2001: 68). Host 
country authorities, including sub-national governments, find themselves in a prisoner's dilemma when 31 
   
multinational enterprises start playing the authorities off against each another to bid up the value of 
incentives. Incentives offered by one particular country may have negative external effects on another 
country, in terms of either countervailing incentives or forgone FDI inflows. 
Policy coordination seems key to escape this dilemma. The scarcity of serious attempts to overcome 
coordination problems and limit competition for FDI is all the more surprising. As noted by Oman 
(2001), there is one major exception, namely the European Union, which offers some lessons of how 
to limit incentives-based competition (Box 4). Developing countries may find the EU approach fairly 
attractive, as “development areas” are granted preferential treatment. If this principle was applied in 
multilateral negotiations on incentives-based competition for FDI, developing countries would have 
more leeway than developed countries to attract FDI by offering incentives. 
Box 4 
Limiting Incentives-based Competition for FDI: The Example of the EUa 
Since the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957, the European Commission has been 
empowered to limit the ability of member countries to offer subsidies to firms and investors. The underlying 
reason was that uncontrolled subsidies could undermine the objective of the Treaty of Rome to achieve a 
common market and a convergence in living standards across member countries. As a result, a system of 
“bounded competition” has emerged, in which subsidies are confined by the European Commission to 
geographically defined lower-income regions (“development areas”). The system may be far from perfect, but 
it offers: 
•  a functional regulatory framework, 
•  an autonomous supervisory body, 
•  procedures for enforcement, and 
•  sanctions backed by provisions for judicial review. 
The EU model may not be easily copied by other countries, or a larger group of less integrated countries. 
Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile to study its features in more detail, in order to tackle the prisoner’s 
dilemma in multilateral negotiations. 
aBased on Oman (2001: 66). 
 
However, a multilateral agreement that seeks to discipline incentives designed to attract FDI “will 
be difficult to achieve and difficult to enforce, given that governments have multiple instruments at 
their disposal to attract FDI or to retain investment” (Hoekman and Saggi 2000: 640). The hope of 
developing countries for an agreement that effectively restrains industrialized countries in providing 
subsidies to foreign investors may prove illusory. The failure of the MAI among OECD countries is 
quite telling in this regard (see Section 4). 
Furthermore, it is open to question whether developing countries could attract substantially more 
FDI, without putting too much strain on their financial resources, if only developed countries were 
restrained in subsidizing FDI. For most FDI projects, developing countries compete with each other, 
rather than with highly developed countries. Oman (2001: 65) observes that “much of the competition 
for FDI is effectively among governments in the same geographic region, i.e. among relative 
neighbours.” Hence, preferential treatment of developing countries with regard to FDI incentives 
would hardly be instrumental to strengthening the bargaining position of developing host countries in 
resisting the demand for incentives by multinational enterprises. 
Its political attractiveness notwithstanding, preferential treatment along the lines of the EU system 
would solve only the minor part of the problem. From an economic perspective, developing countries 
would be well advised to go beyond requests directed at developed countries to reduce their FDI 
incentives and, thereby, offer developing countries better chances in incentives-based competition. 
Self-restraint appears to be indispensable, in order to strengthen the bargaining position of developing 
countries vis-à-vis multinational enterprises. A unilateral withdrawal of incentives is rendered difficult 32 
   
by the prisoner's dilemma. Unless this dilemma is tackled effectively by a binding multilateral 
framework, policy coordination at the regional level could be helpful in preventing an incentives race 
to the top. 
8  Conclusions and Strategic Options 
Several arguments suggest that multilateral negotiations on an investment agreement should not figure 
high on the WTO agenda. Investment rules do exist already in BITs, RTAs and even at the multilateral 
level in TRIMS and GATS. Existing rules may be far from perfect, but it is difficult to conceive that a 
clearly superior set of rules could be agreed upon under the roof of a WTO agreement on investment. 
The most likely outcome of multilateral negotiations on investment will be a “WTO-plus” 
framework. Any WTO member could move beyond the multilaterally defined smallest common 
denominator, by concluding more far-reaching agreements either bilaterally or among regional 
partners. This has an important implication for one of the widely perceived strong-points of a 
multilateral agreement, the reduction of transaction costs. Whatever the relevance of FDI-related 
transaction costs might be under current conditions (the available evidence suggests that they are 
frequently overstated), the complexity of different investment rules and regulations would persist, 
unless BITs and investment rules in RTAs were replaced by a multilateral agreement. This cannot 
reasonably be expected from the Doha Round, which may at most mark the starting point of WTO 
negotiations on investment. Our reasoning is supported by the World Bank (2003: 127–128), which 
notes that the Doha Ministerial Declaration reflects a rather limited approach that does not view a 
multilateral framework as a substitute for BITs and RTAs. It is also mentioned in this context that 
recent negotiating briefs in the WTO indicate that some countries have withdrawn support for 
investor-state dispute settlement, which would lessen investor protection compared to various bi- and 
plurilateral agreements. The transaction-cost argument would become close to irrelevant, if developing 
countries succeeded in preventing strict and generally enforceable rules and insisted on flexibility and 
“development clauses”. 
This is not to ignore that Doha could initiate a long-term process towards more substantive and 
binding multilateral investment rules. Even so, the experience with trade rules suggests that the 
potential of reductions in transaction costs is easily overstated. Substantial trade liberalization at the 
multilateral level has not prevented the “spaghetti bowl” of bilateral and plurilateral trade preferences. 
It is, thus, hardly compelling to argue that, in the course of time, progress with respect to multilateral 
investment rules will render more and more BITs and RTAs redundant. 
The chances to effectively constrain incentives-based competition for FDI do not appear promising 
either. Even though some economists have questioned the public good character of a multilateral 
agreement to stop “bidding wars” (e.g., Langhammer 1999; Kumar 2001), policy coordination seems 
key to escape the prisoner’s dilemma. It would be an important first step to develop an inventory of 
the extent and costs of FDI incentives granted by all WTO members (World Bank 2003). However, 
due to strong opposition, especially from sub-national authorities, the critical issue of incentives-based 
competition for FDI had been removed from the agenda of OECD countries even before the attempt to 
agree on the MAI among themselves failed completely. It seems highly unlikely that developing 
countries unwilling to tie their own hands can achieve binding concessions from industrialized 
countries to cut FDI subsidies. Apart from quid pro quo-considerations, the practical consequences of 
a multilateral agreement would remain limited at best, unless negotiations “enter deeply into the 
taxation regulations of host countries” (Langhammer 1999: 352) and developing countries were 
prepared to constrain incentives-based competition among themselves. 
Furthermore, our analysis underscores the skeptical view expressed in World Bank (2003: 118) that 
“new international agreements that focus on establishing protections to investors cannot be predicted 
to expand markedly the flow of investment to new signatory countries”. It is, obviously, difficult to 
determine, not to speak of predicting, changes in the volume and allocation of FDI resulting from 33 
   
changes in the regulatory environment. Yet, there are several reasons why the effects of a multilateral 
agreement on FDI flows to developing countries are likely to fall short of high expectations: 
•  The absence of such an agreement has not prevented the recent boom of FDI in developing 
countries. 
•  Likewise, substantial unilateral liberalization of FDI regulations was undertaken in the past even 
though multilateral obligations to do so did not exist. 
•  The coverage of protections to investors in various BITs (and RTAs) goes beyond what can be 
expected from the Doha Round. Nevertheless, BITs do not appear to have had a significant impact 
on FDI flows to signatory countries. This can be concluded from several studies applying different 
methodologies and, thereby, reducing the risk of seriously biased results. 
•  As shown elsewhere, it is also questionable whether RTAs such as NAFTA and MERCOSUR had 
a strong and lasting effect on FDI flows to developing member countries (Nunnenkamp 2001b). 
It is against this backdrop that developing countries have to decide on their negotiation strategy 
when it comes to investment-related issues in the current WTO round. Harsh critics of a multilateral 
agreement on investment, e.g., Kumar (2001) and Singh (2001), urge developing countries to take a 
firmly defensive stance. Accordingly, resisting the efforts of industrialized countries to go beyond 
TRIMS is considered the first-best option  for developing countries. As a fall-back  position, Kumar 
(2001) suggests to minimize developing countries’ own commitments (e.g., by excluding pre-entry 
rules, and by insisting on development clauses and exceptions from national treatment even in the 
post-entry phase) and, at the same time, to stick to demands for binding corporate obligations and 
restraints on FDI subsidies granted by industrialized countries. 
The rationale underlying this defensive strategy appears to be that essentially nothing will change if 
a large enough number of developing countries follows this route. Developing countries and 
industrialized countries would block each other. To the extent possible under current conditions, the 
former could still pursue flexible FDI policies deemed necessary to achieve developmental objectives. 
The latter could take this as an “excuse” for not offering concessions as to the demands of developing 
countries.  
Whether a defensive stance is the appropriate strategy for developing countries depends on two 
factors: (i) the costs of giving up flexible FDI policies, and (ii) the benefits to be derived from possible 
concessions by industrialized countries. As concerns the former, the proponents of a defensive strategy 
tend to ignore that the record of governments in developing countries to promote economic 
development by flexible and selective FDI policies is mixed at best (see Sections 5 and 6). Moreover, 
as argued by Hoekman and Saggi (2000: 637), “if a country pursues free trade, a restrictive FDI policy 
will not transfer any rents as foreign firms will not engage in FDI. Instead, they will contest the market 
through exports.” Hence, the costs of giving up discretion are frequently overstated. 
This leads us to suggest an offensive strategy, even though we consider the economic case for a 
multilateral investment agreement to be weak. Developing countries may offer in multilateral 
negotiations not to impose any new performance requirements and phase out existing ones. The 
available evidence on the effectiveness of performance requirements (see Section 6) reveals that 
developing countries have little to lose if they offered to refrain from joint-venture and technology-
sharing requirements, which are not included in the illustrative list of the TRIMS agreement. 
Financially, they may even gain as compensatory incentives, granted to foreign investors in 
conjunction with performance requirements, could be abolished. 
The WTO may be used as a scapegoat for such a move and may, thus, help overcome the opposition 
of rent-seeking constituencies within developing countries. By offering something on their own, 
developing countries will become more relevant negotiation partners for industrialized countries. Only 
then could developing countries reasonably expect industrialized countries to make concessions as a 
quid pro quo. Concessions by industrialized countries may comprise: the relaxation of rules of origin 
applied by the EU and NAFTA, which create similar distortions as local-content requirements of 
developing countries; the inclusion of corporate obligations into a multilateral agreement; and 
restraints on the use of FDI incentives. 34 
   
The proposal for developing countries to enter into a “grand bargain” (Moran 1998; 1999) with 
industrialized countries has been criticized for two reasons by Hoekman and Saggi (2000): 
•  Given the limited use of existing agreements (notably TRIMS), these authors question the 
marginal value of yet another multilateral agreement. However, TRIMS is widely considered to be 
biased against the interests of developing countries. Hence, it may be politically more attractive to 
developing countries to strive for a more balanced agreement by making a fresh start in negotiating 
on investment. 
•  Devising a grand bargain may prove a two-edged sword for developing countries. The potential 
downside can be seen in cross-issue linkage in areas such as labor standards and the environment, 
pushed by industrialized countries and civil-society organizations. Yet, Hoekman and Saggi 
(2000) agree that the grand-bargain argument is one of the raisons d’être of the WTO. Hence, the 
question for developing countries is not whether to offer anything, but what to offer and what to 
demand as a quid pro quo. 
The offensive strategy outlined so far is rather narrowly defined, as cross-issue linkages are 
confined to FDI-related policies. Developing countries may be well advised to look beyond 
negotiations on investment, especially when it comes to concessions demanded from industrialized 
countries. Concessions from industrialized countries would be easier to achieve, if developing 
countries made additional offers related to trade under existing agreements, i.e. GATT and GATS 
(Hoekman and Saggi 2000). Yet, rules-based FDI policies are an important negotiating chip for 
developing countries. Far-reaching offers related to FDI policies would render it increasingly difficult 
for industrialized countries to block negotiations in other areas that are of vital interest to developing 
countries. 
Linking national treatment of foreign investors in the pre-entry stage with cross-border movements 
of workers is an obvious case in point. At present, the request of industrialized countries for an 
agreement on investment is frequently rejected as it would result in an asymmetry, unless free capital 
movement is matched by free labor mobility (e.g., Kumar 2001 and Panagariya 2000, quoted in 
Kumar). However, developing countries should consider the  option to transform this defensive stance 
into an offensive strategy by presenting national treatment in the pre-entry stage as a carrot for 
industrialized countries to engage in negotiations on labor mobility. Economically speaking, the 
arguments for labor mobility are no weaker than those for capital mobility (Hoekman and Saggi 2000). 
The political resistance by industrialized countries to treat labor and capital symmetrically may 
weaken in the longer run at least, when demographic problems mount in various industrialized 
countries. 
Finally, it is for political-economy reasons that we prefer a broadly defined offensive strategy of 
developing countries over the currently prevailing defensive stance. As argued in Section 5.1, the cost-
benefit calculus with respect to a multilateral investment agreement differs across developing 
countries, e.g., depending on what FDI has to offer under different host-country conditions. This 
implies that a united front of developing countries against such an agreement is rather unlikely. 
Furthermore, various developing countries may have little choice but to join a multilateral 
agreement on investment eventually. Some developing countries with large markets and strong 
economic fundamentals could possibly afford to remain outsiders. But small and less attractive 
countries probably cannot, even though a multilateral agreement may not induce more or higher-
quality FDI inflows. The reason is similar to what UNCTAD (1998a) observed with regard to national 
FDI regulations: Not taking part in the trend towards more liberal FDI policies can effectively close 
the door to FDI, whereas liberal FDI policies (or agreeing to a multilateral agreement on investment, 
for that matter) are just a necessary condition for FDI to help achieve national development objectives. 
Conflicting interests among developing countries strengthen the bargaining position of 
industrialized countries. A purely defensive strategy, as suggested by Kumar (2001) and Singh (2001), 
is thus likely to fail. Rather than engaging in a futile attempt to block multilateral negotiations on 
investment altogether, it appears more promising to us to actively take part in negotiations, by making 
own offers and demanding quid pro quo-concessions from industrialized countries. 35 
   
Annex 
Transaction Cost-Related FDI Impediments and Inward FDI: 
Robustness of Correlation Results 
 
The robustness of correlation results presented in Table 3 in Section 5.3 may be questioned on two 
grounds:37F38 
•  Transaction costs might become an issue only if, in their absence, investors wished to invest in a 
developing country. In other words, our correlation results for the overall sample may understate 
the relevance of transaction costs due to the inclusion of developing countries in which reasonable 
profit opportunities do not exist so that FDI will not take place even if transaction costs are low. 
•  The relevance of transaction costs may differ between different types of FDI. Most notably, 
transaction cost-related variables may have varying effects on greenfield investments on the one 
hand, and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on the other hand. 
The first argument suggests to re-run the correlations for a reduced sample. We excluded six (out of 
28) countries, namely Bangladesh, Ghana, Iran, Kenya, Syria and Zimbabwe. The assumption that, 
due to more fundamental bottlenecks to FDI, transaction costs are more or less irrelevant there is 
based on two criteria met by these six sample countries: Per-capita FDI stocks in 1999 were extremely 
small (below US-Dollar 100)38F39 and their share in FDI stocks in all developing countries was below 
0.2 percent. 
Spearman rank correlations did turn out to be somewhat stronger for the reduced sample (Annex 
Table 1). Yet, the results deviate surprisingly little between the full and the reduced sample. None of 
the correlations lacking significance at conventional levels for the full sample becomes significant 
when the above mentioned countries are excluded. This applies to correlations with both, FDI stocks 
in 1999 and FDI flows in 1997–2000. This corroborates the finding that transaction costs were a minor 
factor shaping the distribution of FDI among developing countries. This conclusion holds even for 
those developing countries for which transaction costs could be expected to play a more important 
role. 
Annex Table 1:   Transaction Cost-Related FDI Impediments and Inward FDI: Correlation Results for Full and Reduced 
Samplea 
FDI impedimentsb 
FDI stocks in 1999  FDI flows in 1997–2000 
  full sample  reduced sample  full sample  reduced sample 
      
administrative bottlenecks  –0.53***  –0.64***  –0.39**  –0.49** 
entry  restrictions  –0.09 –0.05 –0.01 –0.05 
post-entry  restrictions  –0.01 –0.21  0.04 –0.11 
risk  factors  –0.62*** –0.76*** –0.54*** –0.64*** 
technology-related regulations  –0.01 –0.27  0.02 –0.11 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively (two tailed). 
a  For reasons given in text, we excluded Bangladesh, Ghana, Iran, Kenya, Syria and Zimbabwe. Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients; inward FDI in US-Dollar per capita of the sample countries' population. – b As of 1999 for 
correlations with FDI stocks; as of 1996 for correlations with FDI flows. 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of UNCTAD online data base and ERT (2000). 
The second argument calls for a disaggregation of overall FDI inflows. We separated greenfield 
investment from M&As by subtracting M&A sales, as given in UNCTAD (2002: Annex Table B.7), 
from total FDI inflows.39F40 Spearman rank correlations are reported in Annex Table 2. As before with 36 
   
regard to sample selection, the disaggregation of FDI inflows has some impact on the correlation 
results, but all major conclusions drawn in Section 5.3 remain valid. Entry restrictions appear to have 
discouraged M&As more than greenfield investment, even though the correlation coefficient turns out 
to be insignificant for both types of FDI inflows. In all other respects, the correlation exercise reveals 
only minor differences between M&As and greenfield investment. The two transaction cost-related 
factors that were negatively correlated with total FDI inflows in a significant way (administrative 
bottlenecks and risk factors) affected M&As and greenfield investment to the same extent. 
Annex Table 2:  Greenfield Investment vs. M&As: Spearman Rank Correlations with Transaction Cost-Related FDI 
Impediments 
FDI impedimentsa 
FDI flows in 1997–2000b 
 total  M&Asc greenfieldc,d 
     
administrative  bottlenecks  –0.39** –0.43** –0.41** 
entry restrictions  –0.01  –0.29  0.16 
post-entry restrictions  0.04  –0.07  0.14 
risk factors  –0.54***  –0.48**  –0.48** 
technology-related regulations 0.02  –0.01 0.15 
*, **, *** significant at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively (two tailed). 
a As of 1996. – b US-Dollar per capita of the sample countries' population. – c Excluding Iran due to missing data. – 
d Approximated by the difference between total FDI inflows and M&A sales. 
Source:  Own calculations on the basis of UNCTAD (2002 and online FDI data base) and ERT (2000). 
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1   For a summary of the relevant literature, see Nunnenkamp (2002: Section 9). 
2   In 2001, all regulatory changes which favored FDI (total of 208) were grouped as follows (UNCTAD 2002: 8): more 
guarantees (24 percent), more liberal entry and operational conditions (28 percent), sectoral liberalization (23 percent), 
and more promotion including incentives (26 percent). 
3   We owe this argument to an anonymous referee. 
4   The World Bank (2003: 127) notes: "The negotiating asymmetries that are common to bilateral agreements have led to 
treaties in which developing countries have taken on substantive obligations without any reciprocity other than the 
promise of increases in future private investment." 
5   FTAA negotiations involve 34 developing countries of Latin America and the West Indies. The United States and 
Canada are the only developed countries taking part. 
6   India and China are also now attempting to enter into a free trade agreement with ASEAN. 
7   The accession to NAFTA by Mexico was due to the expected significant investment and trade benefits which would 
accrue (Krueger 2000). It has been argued that Mexico was able to overcome one decade of opposition to NAFTA due to 
the debt crisis of the 1980s, its extreme trade dependence on the United States and its semi-authoritarian regime prior to 
1991 (Schirm 2002). In addition, the formation of NAFTA was propelled by Mexico's GATT membership since 1986 
and fears of a "Fortress Europe". 
8   The framework for a binational judicial review of tribunal decisions is laid down in Chapter 19 of the NAFTA Treaty. 
9   However, as mentioned before, pressure by the United States played a role in NAFTA and may also shape investment 
rules in FTAA. 
10   According to Rugman and Anderson (1997), however, the NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism was running into 
problems. 
11   Performance requirements are also covered in some BITs involving Canada, Japan and Mexico. 
12   We owe this argument to an anonymous referee. 
13   See, for example, the summary of discussions with regard to trade and investment in DSE Forum (2002: 39 ff.). 
14   For a summary of relevant studies, see Nunnenkamp (2002). 
15   The so-called spaghetti bowl of trade preferences (Bhagwati) clearly suggests that such an outcome would be sub-
optimal from an economic point of view. Yet, for political-economy reasons, we consider it unlikely that a multilateral 
agreement on investment will achieve what proved impossible so far in trade negotiations. 
16   The small sample of 28 countries may compromise the representativeness of survey results for the developing world. 
Note, however, that the sample accounted for 62 percent of FDI flows to all developing countries in 1997–2000 
(UNCTAD online data base). 
17   The business community may have had incomplete information on unilateral liberalization in the past. Improved 
information could then contribute to a fading interest of the private sector in a multilateral agreement. On the other hand, 
the business community may still consider a multilateral agreement to be the best means to lock in previous unilateral 
liberalization measures, i.e. render them irreversible.   
18   The remainder of this section draws on Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2002). 
19   Both, FDI stocks and flows are considered in US-Dollar per capita of the sample countries' population in the correlation 
analysis. In this way, we avoid the large-country bias that characterizes the distribution of FDI in absolute terms. 
20   The robustness of results was checked in two respects; see Annex for details. 
21   It is for two reasons that we ran separate regressions for each index with the same controlling variables. First, the indices 
on FDI impediments reveal a fairly high degree of multicollinearity. Second, we retain more degrees of freedom in this 
way. 
22   These results are not shown here in order to save space. 
23   For an evaluation of mandatory technology transfers and other performance requirements, see Section 6. 40 
   
 
24   Special treatment of developing countries was codified in GATT through the so-called Part IV Extension in 1965 and the 
Enabling Clause on "Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing 
Countries" in 1979. 
25   See also Langhammer (1999) and the literature given there. 
26   See also Section 6 on performance requirements. 
27   We owe this point to Alan Winters. 
28   Note that performance requirements related to exports etc. constituted one element of post-entry restrictions considered 
in Section 5.3; technology targeting constituted one element of technology-related regulations (see Box 3 for details). 
29   The score improved (i.e., declined) in 43 out of 84 entries in Table 4; it remained constant in 38 cases. 
30   FDI stocks are considered in per-capita terms, in order to control for country size; further details can be found in 
Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2002). 
31   This unexpected result is mainly because Malaysia reported the highest inward FDI stock per capita in 1999 (US-Dollar 
2234) among all sample countries, even though it was rated most unfavorably in Table 4 with regard to technology 
targeting in 1999. 
32   This remains unlikely, however, if the host country pursues trade policies giving rise to a strong anti-export bias. 
33   According to Hoekman and Saggi (2000: 630), "the schizophrenic nature of the overall policy environment" is reflected 
in that FDI incentives are granted in conjunction with performance requirements. 
34   See Section 8 for a discussion of strategic options of developing countries. 
35   The subsequent discussion draws on Kokko (2002) and the literature given there. 
36   As noted earlier in the context of BITs (Section 2) and transaction costs (Section 5.3), it is difficult to determine what the 
allocation of FDI would have been in the absence of one particular element of the regulatory framework governing FDI. 
This is particularly so when it comes to FDI incentives for which there is a serious lack of data. 
37   For an overview of the relevant literature in this regard, see Nunnenkamp (2002). 
38   We owe the following arguments to T.N. Srinivasan and Simon Evenett. 
39   The average for all 28 sample countries amounted to almost US-Dollar 500. 
40   Note that this results in an imperfect proxy of greenfield investment since the data sets on total FDI flows and M&As are 
not consistent with each other. 